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I. Introduction 
 
It is common knowledge in the tax field that, if a taxpayer 
is reimbursed for an expenditure or loss, there is no difference in 
the federal income tax2 consequences whether either the 
reimbursement is excluded from the taxpayer’s gross income and 
 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I would like 
to thank Adam Feilbelman, Brant Hellwig, Douglas Kahn, Leandra 
Lederman and Lawrence Zelenak for their helpful comments and 
suggestions to this article. I would also like to thank the 
participients of the Santa Clara Law School work-in-progress 
group.  
2 Unless stated otherwise, the author is discussing federal income 
tax considerations throughout the article.  
2no deduction is allowed for the expenditure or loss, or instead a 
full deduction3 is allowed for the expenditure or loss and the 
reimbursement is included in the taxpayer’s gross income.4 To 
illustrate, consider the circumstances of an employer’s 
reimbursement of an employee’s business expense. 
G expends $2,000 for travel expenses for a business trip 
that G made on behalf of her employer. In the same year, the 
employer reimburses G for the $2,000 expense. Apart from this 
expenditure and the reimbursement, G had taxable income of 
$35,000 that year. If G is allowed a full deduction for the $2,000 
she spent and is required to include the reimbursement in her gross 
income, she will still have $35,000 in taxable income.5 If, instead, 
the reimbursement is excluded from G’s gross income and no 
deduction is allowed for her payment of the travel expenses, she 
will also have taxable income of $35,000. So, on its face, it would 
 
3 In general, the deduction must be a nonitemized deduction to be 
fully deductible. An itemized deduction is subject to limitations so 
that all or part of the item may not be deductible. See Jeffrey H. 
Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural 
Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8
(2005).  
4 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Idemnity 
Payments: Recovery of Capital and The Contours of Gross 
Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1991) (“Not allowing a 
deduction for a loss, but treating a recovery of the loss in a later 
year as a return of capital, yields the same result – no net income – 
as allowing a deduction for the loss and taxing the recovery.”).  
5 The $2,000 deduction for the expenditure will wash out the 
$2,000 income from the reimbursement, and so the taxpayer will 
be left with the $35,000 of taxable income.  
3appear that, for income tax purposes, the exclusion of the 
reimbursement is identical to allowing a deduction for the 
expenditure.6 Indeed, it is because of that identity that the Internal 
Revenue Service (the Service) permits an employee simply to 
exclude a reimbursement for a deductible employee expense rather 
than to include the reimbursement and take a deduction for the 
expenditure.7
While there is no difference in tax consequences for an 
exclusion or deduction when the expenditure or loss is reimbursed, 
there is a significant difference if no deduction is allowed and the 
taxpayer is not fully reimbursed. There are numerous provisions in 
the Internal Revenue Code8 (the Code) where a reimbursement of 
an expenditure or loss is excluded from income even though no 
deduction is allowable to the taxpayer for the portion of an 
 
6 Of course, the taxpayer’s gross income will be greater if a 
deduction is chosen instead of an exclusion. But, the taxpayer’s 
taxable income, which is the figure to which tax rates are applied, 
will be identical in either case. The size of a taxpayer’s gross 
income is not irrelevant, but it is significant in only a limited 
number of circumstances. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 543(b)(2). Also, if the 
reimbursement is received in a year after the expenditure, the tax 
consequence of a deduction for the latter or an exclusion of the 
former will depend upon the taxpayer’s marginal tax bracket in 
each year. But if we ignore tax rate differentials, the deduction and 
the income items are equal and so net out to zero. Any difference 
in tax brackets is random and will sometimes favor the taxpayer 
and sometimes favor the government.  
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(1). To qualify for exclusion, the 
employee must have been required to provide the employer with an 
accounting of the expenses and done so. Id.
8 References herein to the Internal Revenue Code (“Code” or 
“I.R.C.”) are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.  
4expenditure or loss that is not reimbursed. Since the exclusion and 
deduction approaches generally are identical for tax purposes, one 
might expect there to be parallel treatment of reimbursed and 
unreimbursed expenditures and losses. That is, one might expect a 
taxpayer who incurs an expenditure or loss to be treated the same 
by the tax law whether the item is reimbursed or not. Yet, there are 
many cases in which that is not so. The disparate treatment of 
reimbursed and unreimbursed taxpayers in those cases seems 
inequitable to some who believe that either deductions should be 
allowed for unreimbursed items or, if not, no exclusion should be 
allowed for the receipt of a reimbursement.9 While not all 
commentators have urged that parallelism should be the rule, the 
question of whether to adopt parallel treatment in specific 
circumstances is frequently discussed in tax courses.10 
If the tax law were both to exclude from income the receipt 
of a recovery or reimbursement for a loss or expenditure and also 
to allow an unrestricted deduction to a taxpayer who incurred the 
same type of loss or expenditure but who was not reimbursed, the 
author would describe that approach as “parallel” treatment. By 
 
9 See, e.g., KLEIN, BANKMAN & SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION at pp. 123, 141 (13th ed. 2003); KLEIN, BANKMAN &
SHAVIRO, TEACHER’S MANUAL – FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 56 
(13th ed. 2003); SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 490 (2004) (“There is no obvious policy justification 
for this general disfavoring of deductions relative to exclusions.”). 
Contra, Sophie Hudson CITE; and Zelenak, supra note 4, at 387.  
10 Id.
5“parallel” treatment, the author means that similar, but not 
necessarily identical, situations are given the same tax treatment. If 
such situations are treated differently by the tax law, the author 
refers to that approach as “nonparallel” treatment. Nonparallel 
treatment results in disparate tax treatment of taxpayers who 
occupy similar positions, and that difference violates the principle 
of horizontal equity.11 Nonparallel treatment is then one type of 
violation of the principle of horizontal equity.  Consider the 
following illustration of nonparallel treatment by the Code.  
Code section 104(a)(2) excludes from income 
compensatory damages received by a taxpayer on account of a 
physical injury.12 In essence, as shown above, this exclusion is the 
same, for tax purposes, as requiring the taxpayer to include the 
damage payment in income but also providing a matching full 
deduction for the amount of the damages.13 Thus, the Code 
 
11 The meaning of “horizontal equity” is explained at infra note 
15.  
12 One exception to that exclusion is that a reimbursement of 
medical expenses that were previously deducted by the injured 
party are included in the latter’s income. I.R.C. § 104(a). 
13 For the deduction to be an exact equivalent to an exclusion of 
the payment, the deduction would have to be allowable in the same 
year that the injured taxpayer received the payment from the 
tortfeasor, and that will not usually be the case. But, the principal 
significance of there being a different time sequence is that the 
marginal rates for the deduction and the income may differ because 
they fall in different tax years; and that difference in marginal rates 
can be ignored because it will have a random effect. See supra note 
6. While the difference in time also raises a “time value” issue, the 
amount of time value money likely will be small.    
6provides the equivalent of a deduction for a loss based on a 
physical injury for which compensation is received. That suggests 
that, in order to have parallel treatment, taxpayers should be 
allowed a deduction for a loss resulting from an uncompensated 
physical injury.  
No such deduction currently exists, and so the Code does 
not adopt parallel treatment in this circumstance. That is, the Code 
effectively provides a deduction for the taxpayer who happens to 
be compensated for a physical injury,14 but provides no 
corresponding relief for a taxpayer who is not compensated. This 
lack of parallelism also results in a contravention of the principle 
of horizontal equity.15 Assume A and B are injured in separate car 
 
14 As noted, the exclusion from income is equivalent to allowing a 
deduction for the loss.  
15 Horizontal equity requires that persons in like net income 
positions pay the same amount of income tax. Douglas Kahn, 
Accelerated Depreciation – Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance 
for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.5 (1979). The 
goal of differently taxing individuals with disparate net income is 
referred to as vertical equity. WILLIAM ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 7-8 (5th ed. 1999). The goal of vertical equity 
generally includes a requirement that there be an “appropriate” 
difference in taxation. See Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange,
1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607 (1993). Many people disagree about 
what type of difference is appropriate.  
Horizontal and vertical equity are two aspects of the same 
principle. See id. at 612 and Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal 
Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 195 (1992). Contra Richard A. 
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
354 (1993) (contending that horizontal equity has independent 
significance that is distinct from vertical equity). While, for 
7accidents and sustain similar physical injuries that are valued at the 
same amount.16 A’s injuries were caused by a wealthy individual 
and A is compensated one million dollars for the damages caused 
by the accident. B is struck by an individual with limited means 
and is not able to recover any damages for his injuries. Assume 
that, other than the damage recovery, A and B have the same 
amount of taxable income.  
Since A’s injury was physical, A is able to exclude the one 
million dollars recovery from income under Code section 104(a)(2) 
and therefore is not taxed on that amount. A and B are treated as 
having equal income for tax purposes and will pay the same 
amount of income tax. By providing A an exclusion (the 
equivalent of allowing A a deduction for the injury) and denying a 
deduction to B, the tax system has violated horizontal equity since 
A and B are taxed the same amount even though A has received 
one million dollars more in that year than B.17 Putting it 
differently, A effectively is allowed a deduction for his injury 
(offsetting the compensation received), while B is denied a 
 
convenience, this article refers only to horizontal equity, it applies 
equally to vertical equity.  
16 There are serious administrative difficulties in determining the 
value of an uncompensated physical injury, the presence of which 
is itself one of the reasons for not allowing a deduction for those 
losses.  
17 As noted, this assumes that A and B are equals for purposes of 
income comparisons. Also note that while nonparallel treatment 
will contravene the principle of horizontal equity, it is only one of 
the ways in which equity can be violated.  
8deduction for a virtually identical (but uncompensated) injury. As 
we shall see later in this article, while horizontal equity can be 
obtained by allowing a full deduction for such losses, that remedy 
contravenes other policies. Horizontal and vertical equity, as is true 
for parallelism, are merely one of the myriad goals of a good tax 
system and so must give way when weightier considerations point 
in a different direction.18 The treatment of personal injury damages 
is discussed in Part IV B in this article.  
The principal issue that this article addresses is whether 
parallelism should be a compelling goal of the tax system. That 
question arises in connection with numerous Code provisions, of 
which the treatment of physical damages is merely one example. 
The issue of whether to adopt parallelism obviously arises 
whenever the Code allows an exclusion for a reimbursement or 
recovery of a nondeductible item, but it also arises when there are 
limitations on the amount of deduction allowable that do not apply 
if the item is reimbursed or otherwise recovered.19 
18 Some commentators contend that horizontal and vertical equity 
have no independent significance. See Kaplow, supra note 15 and 
McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15.  
19 While the lack of parallelism exists just as much when the 
amount of deduction allowable is limited to less than the full 
amount of the expenditure or loss, the commentary objecting to 
nonparallel treatment has focused primarily on cases where no 
deduction is allowable. Nonparallelism can also arise in other 
circumstances. For example, Professors Dodge and Soled state that 
the nonrecognition granted by Code § 1031 for exchanges of 
certain like-kind property is contrary to tax policy because a sale of 
9It is the thesis of this article that there can be different 
considerations applicable to reimbursed expenditures and losses 
than apply to unreimbursed items. There may be compelling 
reasons for excluding a reimbursement from income that do not 
apply to the determination of whether to allow a deduction for 
unreimbursed items. And, there can be compelling reasons to deny 
a deduction for an unreimbursed item that do not apply to the 
treatment of reimbursements.20 In other words, the apparent 
equivalence of the deduction and exclusion is deceptive because 
different policy considerations can apply to each. So, the crucial 
question in such cases is whether the goal of parallel treatment is 
sufficiently strong to outweigh the other considerations.  
This analysis has led the author to conclude that parallel 
treatment not only is not compelled, it is not always desirable 
because of countervailing considerations that weigh more heavily. 
Each instance of nonparallel treatment must be examined to 
determine whether the contravention of parallelism is warranted.21 
such property immediately followed by a reinvestment is a taxable 
transaction. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the 
Basis Myth Under the Income Tax, FSU College of Law Public 
Law Research Paper No. 149; FSU College of Law-Econ Research 
Paper No. 05-17 (available at ssrn.com/abstract=681578).  The 
disparity of treatment noted by Professors Dodge and Soled is 
similar to the nonparallelism that is examined in this article, but 
does not fall within the definition of nonparallelism as used herein. 
20 See Zelenak, supra note 4, at 387.  
21 See Hudson, supra note 9, at __. If you determine that there is no 
merit to allowing an exclusion, then obviously that exclusion 
10
This article will examine a number of provisions where the Code 
fails to provide parallel treatment for exclusions and deductions, 
including some in which no deduction is allowable for 
unreimbursed items and some where deductions are allowable but 
are subject to limitations. In each case, the relevant considerations 
will be examined.22 
II. Horizontal Equity – The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange 
The principle of horizontal equity23 typically will not 
resolve a question as to what tax treatment is proper for a specific 
circumstance because its application rests on a determination that 
parties are in equal positions; and the determination of equality 
rests on a choice of the contact points that are to be compared, 
about which reasonable people can disagree and often do so. For 
individual income tax purposes, equality refers to income, and thus 
income is the item on which individuals are to be compared; but 
 
should be repealed. However, the reason for that repeal would be 
to eliminate an unwarranted tax benefit rather than to obtain 
parallel treatment even though one consequence of the repeal 
would be the elimination of the nonparallelism that existed.  
22 This article addresses only a small number of instances of 
nonparallelism to illustrate the type of analysis that is required. 
There are numerous nonparallel provisions that are not discussed 
herein. For example, most of the employee fringe benefits that are 
excluded from an employee’s income would not be deductible if 
paid by the employee or by a self-employed individual. Also, the 
deferral provided for employee retirement plans is more extensive 
than that provided for the self-employed. Each of those 
nonparallelisms should be examined in the same manner that is 
applied to the ones discussed herein.  
23 See supra note 15. 
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there is not universal agreement as to what items are to be taken 
into account to determine a person’s income.24 
Some commentators have concluded that horizontal equity 
is not a useful concept for determining whether a provision is good 
or bad because the horizontal equity concept rests on a choice of 
what the proper measurement of income should be.25 Even if one 
concurred with that view, horizontal equity might be seen as a 
surrogate for “basic economic or justice decisions”26 or as a signal 
that a problem exists. In other words, the fact that two persons who 
appear to be in similar income circumstances are taxed differently 
suggests that there may be a flaw somewhere in the tax system. By 
contrast, Professors McDaniel and Repetti rejected that view and 
concluded that the concept of horizontal equity not only does not 
aid in uncovering tax problems, but can actually conceal problems 
and lead policymakers astray because it places an obstacle between 
the policymaker and the actual problem.27 The two professors 
contend that it is better to go directly to the underlying problem 
than to focus on the fact that a flaw in the tax system has caused 
some persons to be treated inequitably. In an important sense, 
while the author does not agree with many of the conclusions that 
 
24 See e.g., Kahn, supra note 15. 
25 Kaplow, supra note 15 and McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15. 
Contra, Musgrave supra note 15. 
26 McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 15, at 619. 
27 Id. at 622.  
12
the two professors reached, the thesis and analysis of this article 
conforms to the policy that Professors McDaniel and Repetti 
advocate. The focus of this piece is on the difference in tax 
treatment of what appear to be very similar items rather than on the 
inequitable consequence of that treatment; and so the analysis set 
forth herein directly addresses the underlying problem.  
Whatever may be the merits of the conflicting views on the 
role of horizontal equity, the parallelism concept, which is the 
focus of this article, is not subject to those objections. If two 
persons receive different tax treatment for the same type of 
expenditure, which is what the author refers to as nonparallel 
treatment, that disparate treatment raises serious issues of propriety 
whether or not those issues are classified as violations of horizontal 
equity. Regardless of the name given to this problem, it is a goal of 
the tax system to avoid its occurrence. The establishment of equal 
treatment of the same items not only serves the normative goal of 
“fairness;” it also provides the taxpaying public with confidence 
that they are being treated fairly; and that perception is as 
important as the reality. Fairness of treatment then is a normative 
value on which the parallelism concept is based. The word 
“parallelism” was chosen by the author to designate that goal 
because it is useful to have a common term to refer to it.  
13
Professor Musgrave stated that almost everyone agrees 
with the principle that people in equal positions should be given 
equal treatment.28 Professors Kaplow, McDaniel and Repetti, while 
disagreeing with Professor Musgrave’s thesis, do not reject that 
statement. Rather, they question the utility of the concept of 
equality because of the difficulty in determining the proper items 
of comparison.29 But, for purposes of an income tax, there is no 
dispute that income is the proper measure for comparisons; and 
when the items to be compared are indistinguishable, there is no 
need to refer to or resolve questions of what constitutes income.  
Putting aside the question of the significance of the 
horizontal and vertical equity concepts, let us now focus on 
parallelism.  Clearly, parallelism (i.e., equal treatment of similar 
items) must be taken into account in evaluating some provisions. 
To take it into account, however, does not mean that it must prevail 
over other legitimate goals of the tax system with which it is in 
conflict. As will be shown later in this article, the principle of 
 
28 Musgrave, supra note 15, at 355. 
29 On the issue of whether “equality” has any meaning in the 
administrative of justice, Compare Peter Weston, The Empty Idea 
of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) with Erwin 
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor 
Weston, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Anthony D’Amato, 
Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600
(1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV.
245 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As a Comparative 
Right, 65 B.U.L. REV. 387 (1985). See also McDaniel & Repetti, 
supra note 15, at 612, n. 28. 
14
parallelism is merely one factor to be considered and does not 
unilaterally provide a definitive answer as to whether a tax 
provision should be retained. However, merely because a principle 
is not sufficient by itself to determine a result does not mean that it 
is a nullity. 
Parallelism is related to the horizontal equity principle in 
that nonparallel treatment will result in unequal treatment of some 
persons.  While this article focuses on parallelism, all that is 
written herein also applies to the broader principle of horizontal 
equity. For those few who consider horizontal equality to be 
irrelevant, the application of this article’s reasoning to that 
principle is of no consequence; but many persons do give weight to 
horizontal equity; and even those who do not frown on unequal 
treatment of the same item. 
III. The Beguiling Attractiveness of Parallelism 
It is easy to see why many find the concept of parallelism 
so attractive. Parallelism requires that taxpayers with the same loss 
or expenditure be treated the same. Lack of parallelism 
instinctively appears to be unfair. Indeed, there is a perverseness in 
the tax law’s more favorable treatment of the reimbursed party 
than is provided to the one who is not compensated for his loss or 
expenditure since the latter is more deserving of sympathy. In the 
example above concerning the physical injuries suffered by A and 
15
B, why does A receive what amounts to a deduction for his loss but 
B does not? Both A and B suffer the same type and dollar amount 
of loss but the tax system treats them differently by effectively 
allowing A a deduction but denying any deduction to B even 
though A clearly is the better off of the two.  
As noted above, a failure to provide parallel treatment 
violates the frequently cited goal of horizontal equity. In our 
example, A and B will be taxed the same despite the large 
difference in their income. Horizontal equity can be achieved only 
if A and B are given parallel treatment, either by providing a 
deduction to both or by denying a deduction to both. 
However, upon a more careful review, it becomes clear that 
parallelism is not always the optimum result. To illustrate, consider 
the case of a refunded income tax payment.30 X pays a federal 
income tax of $23,000 for the year 2000. None of that payment is 
deductible.31 In the year 2003, it is determined that X should have 
paid an income tax for 2000 of only $20,000. Accordingly, the 
Service returns $3,000 to X. X is not required to include that 
refund in income. The $3,000 refund is excluded from X’s gross 
income because it is not an accession of wealth but instead a return 
 
30 For a similar example involving a refunded fine, see Zelenak, 
supra note 4, at 387. See also DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 246-50 (3rd ed. 
2004).  
31 I.R.C. § 275(a).  
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of the money erroneously paid to the government. As noted, the 
effect of this exclusion is equivalent to allowing X a deduction for 
the $3,000 overpayment in the year that he received the refund.32 
Also, for the year 2000, Y paid a federal income tax of 
$23,000. In the year 2005, it is discovered that Y should have paid 
an income tax of only $20,000. Because the statute of limitations 
for claiming a refund had expired, Y does not receive a refund for 
his $3,000 overpayment of the year 2000 tax. Y is not allowed a 
deduction for that unrefunded overpayment. But, X is allowed to 
exclude the $3,000 refund he received. It is unlikely that the lack 
of parallel treatment for X and Y will bother anyone even though 
the tax favored party, X, is better off economically than is the 
disfavored Y. It illustrates that each case must be judged on the 
considerations that apply. 
While the visceral reaction to the nonparellelism in the 
above scenario is that it is appropriate, let us examine the treatment 
more closely to see why that is so. Why should Y be denied a 
deduction for the overpayment of his taxes? One answer is that a 
deduction is allowed for a loss only if there are compelling reasons 
for it. Losses incurred in a business or profit-seeking activity are 
 
32 Another way to view this occurrence is to apply the transactional 
approach and treat the refund as a retroactive reduction of the 
payment that was previously made. This same approach can be 
applied to other circumstances. One example is the discussion of 
tax indemnity payments in Part IV C of this article.  
17
generally deductible33 Personal losses are not deductible unless 
they are the product of a theft or casualty.34 Y’s loss is not a 
business or profit-oriented loss and is not a casualty or theft loss.  
A second and even more compelling reason for denying a 
deduction is that the qualification for such a deduction would turn 
on a finding that the tax for the year 2000 was overpaid. The point 
of having a statute of limitations is to prevent the necessity of 
examining the correctness of returns for which the statutory period 
has run.  For the allowance of a deduction to have any meaning, 
the prior return for the year 2000 would have to be kept open, and 
that would frustrate the purpose of having a limitations period. 
On the other hand, if the overpayment is refunded before 
the statute of limitations has run, there is no policy that would be 
frustrated by excluding the refund from the taxpayer’s gross 
income. To the contrary, there is a policy reason to exclude the 
refund and that policy would be contravened if it were taxed. The 
refund is a return of the taxpayer’s money and there are strong 
reasons not to tax someone on the recovery of his own money 
because the taxpayer has not realized a gain in any meaningful 
 
33 I.R.C. § 165(c)(1), (2). 
34 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). The rationale for allowing a deduction for 
casualty and theft losses is discussed in Jeffrey Kahn,  Personal 
Deductions—An ‘Ideal’ or Just Another ‘Deal’?, 2002
M.S.U.D.C.L. Law Review 1, 37-40. See also infra text 
accompanying notes 52-55. 
18
sense.35 The entire system of utilizing basis to determine gain36 
rests on the notion that one should not be taxed on the recovery of 
one’s own money. 
In sum, there are strong policy reasons to deny a deduction 
for an unrefunded overpayment of taxes; but, not only are there no 
policy reasons to tax a refund, there are policy considerations that 
require its exclusion. The critical question then is whether the goal 
of parallel treatment is important enough to warrant either granting 
a deduction for the unrefunded overpayment or, instead, taxing the 
refund. In other words, does the goal of parallel treatment 
outweigh either of the considerations discussed above? The 
resolution of that question turns on value judgments. The author 
believes that it is obvious that parallel treatment in this case is less 
important than the considerations whose satisfaction results in 
nonparallel treatment.  
Let us examine one variation of the scenario set forth 
above. Assume that in Y’s case, the Service voluntarily refunded 
the overpayment even though the statute of limitations on refund 
 
35 An exception to that policy occurs when the tax benefit rule 
applies to a recovery because the taxpayer had previously taken a 
deduction that provided him with a tax benefit. I.R.C. § 111. See 
also DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX 183-84 (5th ed. 2005). The reason for this exception is to 
prevent the taxpayer from retaining a tax benefit for an expenditure 
which he subsequently recovered. The policy of preventing a 
taxpayer from retaining a deduction for which he is no longer 
entitled outweighs the policy of not taxing a return of capital.  
36 I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
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claims had run. Obviously, that is unrealistic,37 but let us consider 
the tax consequences nevertheless.  
In the author’s view, the refund should not be taxed. Since 
the parties involved, who are at arms’ length, have concluded that 
there was an overpayment, the Service should accept that 
conclusion. It does not require a reexamination of the year 2000 
tax return because the parties have reached an agreement. The fact 
that one of the parties is the Service itself makes the case much 
stronger, but the result should be the same if the payor were a third 
party other than the Service.38 The only question that might arise 
is whether the return of the funds is due to some reason other than 
a determination that there was an overpayment –i.e., was this a 
disguised compensation for some service or property? That issue 
does not arise when the payor is the Service itself. 
The above example is meant to illustrate the type of 
analysis that is required when examining provisions that provide 
nonparallel treatment. The next section of the article will examine 
a number of specific Code provisions that produce nonparallel 
results for taxpayers. In each case, the author will analyze whether 
such treatment is justified after examining the policies 
underpinning the provisions. 
 
37 See I.R.C. '' 6402(a), 6514, 7405.  
38 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV C 
of the article.  
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IV. Selected Nonparallel Tax Provisions 
A. Damage to Property  
If a taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property, 
the taxpayer includes the recovery in income only to the extent that 
it exceeds the basis of the property.39 For purpose of this rule, it 
does not matter whether the payor is the person who damaged the 
property or an insurer.40 As discussed in detail below, this 
exclusion is in sharp contrast to the severe restrictions on the 
amount of deduction allowable to a taxpayer who is not 
compensated for the loss when the property in question was not 
used for a business or profit-making purpose.   
Prior to examining these conflicting treatments, it is useful 
to review the tax treatment where a taxpayer voluntarily sells 
personal use property. For example, X owns a personal use 
automobile with a basis of $5,000. X sells the automobile to Y for 
$8,000 cash, thereby realizing and recognizing a gain of $3,000.41 
X is required to include the $3,000 gain that he recognizes in his 
income. However, X pays no tax on the other $5,000 that X 
receives from Y. The tax system treats the $5,000 cash as a 
 
39 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 77-78; Raytheon 
Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). In appropriate circumstances, a 
taxpayer can defer all or part of the gain realized on an involuntary 
conversion by investing in similar property within a specified time 
period. I.R.C. § 1033.  
40 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 77. 
41 I.R.C. § 1011. 
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nontaxable return of capital as measured by X’s basis in the 
automobile.  
What are the tax consequences to X if the automobile’s fair 
market value is less than X’s basis? Assume X receives only 
$3,000 cash from Y for his personal car. Now, X realizes and 
recognizes a $2,000 loss on the transaction. Again, X pays no tax 
on the return of capital, in this case the $3,000 cash. But what of 
the $2,000 basis that X failed to recover? The current tax system 
will not allow X any deduction for the $2,000 recognized loss 
since the automobile was personal use, rather than business or 
investment, property.42 
What is the justification for not allowing X to deduct the 
loss that he recognized in an arm’s length transaction with an 
unrelated person? Basically, the loss is seen as an element of the 
personal consumption of the asset. The decline in value of a 
personal use asset that arises because of wear and tear, exhaustion 
or obsolescence is not deductible because it is seen as a cost of the 
personal use or consumption of the asset. That treatment is 
consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income.43 Even if the 
 
42 I.R.C. § 165.  
43 The Haig-Simons definition of income is the most commonly 
cited definition for tax policy purposes. It defines income for a 
period as the sum of the increase in wealth accumulated by the 
person plus the market value of the person’s personal consumption. 
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1980) (1938). Thus, in the above example, the system 
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decline in the asset’s value is due to market factors – as contrasted 
to wear and tear or exhaustion - that decline in value is seen as part 
of the cost of owning the asset and so is seen as part of the cost of 
personal consumption.  
Professor Richard Epstein argued that such market decline 
is not an element of consumption and therefore should be 
deductible under our tax system.44 In order to distinguish between 
personal consumption and market decline, Professor Epstein 
suggested that taxpayers should be required to reduce their basis in 
all depreciable assets (business, investment and personal use) 
under a cost recovery system. While no deduction would be 
allowable for the depreciation of personal use assets, a taxpayer 
would still reduce his basis in that property to reflect the personal 
consumption. Under such a system, the taxpayer would be allowed 
a deduction for any loss recognized on a sale of a personal use 
asset on the assumption that such loss was not due to consumption 
by the taxpayer and therefore should be deductible as a true loss of 
wealth under the Haig-Simons definition of income. As discussed 
by Professor  Epstein, this proposed system would not always 
 
denies a deduction to X because it assumes that the decline in 
value of the automobile is due to the personal consumption or use 
by X. As consumption is one element of income under Haig-
Simons, there should be no deduction for that use.  
44 Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal 
Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454, 
461 (1970). 
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benefit taxpayers since it could cause recognition of gain, or a 
greater amount of gain, when the item is sold for more than the 
adjusted basis.45 
One problem with Professor Epstein=s proposal is that it 
imposes a significant administrative burden. It seems likely that 
individuals generally are not equipped to deal with the effects of 
depreciation on personal items even when it is deductible. For 
example, when an individual sells a residence for which he had 
been taking a deduction for the business use of part of that 
property, unless the individual consults a tax expert, it seems 
unlikely that, in reporting the tax consequences of the sale, the 
individual will reflect the resulting reduction of basis and the 
inapplicability of the Code section 121 exclusion of gain to the 
portion of the property that was so used. It is doubtful that 
individuals would do any better in reflecting a decline in basis for 
exclusively personal use property. It is just a bit too complex a 
system to expect average persons to understand it, much less to 
recall it when the time arrives. But, let us put aside administrative 
concerns and consider the merits of Professor Epstein=s proposal. 
The treatment of gains and losses are examined separately. 
First, let us examine the treatment of a gain under Professor 
Epstein=s proposal. Assume the following facts in which the 
 
45 Id.
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Epstein system has been adopted and Code section 121 has been 
repealed.  G purchased a residence on leased land for $100,000. 
Assume that the nondeductible depreciation for the building is 
$5,000 per year. After four years, G sold the residence for 
$115,000, and G=s adjusted basis in the residence, under Professor 
Epstein=s system, is $80,000. So, G has a gain of $35,000. Of that 
gain, $15,000 is attributable to appreciation in value that took place 
while G held the property. But, what of the remaining $20,000 of 
gain? That is attributable to the reduction in basis caused by the 
nondeductible depreciation. Would it be appropriate to tax G on 
that $20,000 of gain? 
The depreciation of G=s basis reflects the fact that the 
amount expended by G to purchase the residence was used up (i.e., 
consumed) in the year for which the depreciation is charged.46 If 
the tax law were to include in G=s income the imputed income 
from his use of the residence, a deduction would then have to be 
allowed for the depreciation of the property (i.e., the amount that G 
paid for each year=s Aincome@ from the property would be allocated 
to that Aincome@). Since imputed income from the use of property 
is not taxed, no deduction is allowed for the portion of the 
purchase price that is allocable to each year=s use. But, Professor 
Epstein=s system would reduce the basis of the property to reflect 
 
46 See Kahn, supra note 15, at 13-14. 
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that a portion of the purchase price was consumed by G and so 
should not shelter the proceeds of the sale from being taxed. While 
there is merit to that analysis, there are reasons to oppose the 
application of that system to the recognition of gain.  
The $20,000 of gain that G recognized is attributable to 
nondeductible depreciation. It is possible to view that gain as a 
Arecapture@ of the depreciation, and the current tax law generally 
does so when the depreciation is deductible.47 Apart from the 
Arecapture@ rules, the reduction of basis for depreciable property 
can cause gain recognition on the disposition of the property.  
Should the recapture of a nondeductible item be included in 
income for the same reasons? In analogous circumstances, the tax 
benefit rule and Code section 111 do not tax the recovery of a 
deducted item when the deduction did not provide a tax benefit.48 
While the tax benefit rule does not apply to prevent the reduction 
of basis for depreciation that is an allowable deduction,49 it would 
contravene the principles on which the tax benefit rests to tax the 
recovery of nondeductible depreciation. While Code section 111 
applies only to the recovery of a deduction that did not create a tax 
 
47 See I.R.C. '' 1245 and 1250. For a contrary view of that gain, 
see Kahn, supra note 15, at 46-53. In the case of real property that 
has been held for more than one year, only the accelerated portion 
of depreciation is subjected to the recapture rules.  
48 See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 35, at 183-84. 
49 I.R.C. ' 1016(a)(2) reduces basis for the amount of depreciation 
deduction that was allowable to the taxpayer regardless of whether 
it gave rise to a tax benefit.  
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benefit, it would be perverse to tax the recovery of an item for 
which no deduction was allowable when the recover of a deducted 
item is not taxed if the deduction did not provide a tax benefit. The 
policies that underlie the tax benefit rule support the exclusion of 
gain generated by a reduction in basis for nondeductible 
depreciation. On balance, the author finds the reasons for not 
taxing such gain stronger than the reasons for doing so. 
As to Professor Epstein=s proposal to allow a loss deduction 
when the personal use asset is sold for less than its adjusted basis, 
he is correct that the recognized loss reflects a decline in market 
value, assuming that the depreciation schedule that is adopted 
accurately reflects the taxpayer=s consumption. However, a decline 
in market value can be seen as a form of consumption in that it is 
part of the cost the taxpayer incurs to have and use the item. Later 
in this article, the author discusses the limitations imposed by 
Congress on the deduction allowable for a casualty or theft loss of 
personal use property.50 In that discussion, the author notes that 
there is reason to distinguish casualty and theft losses from a 
decline in value due to market conditions; but even in the former 
circumstance, Congress allows only a very restricted amount of 
deduction.51 There is much less reason to allow any deduction for 
a loss due to decline in market conditions, since that loss of value 
 
50 See infra the text accompanying notes 55 to 62.  
51 I.R.C. ' 165(h).  
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is part of the cost of enjoying the use of the item. The author 
concludes that, while Professor Epstein=s proposal is intriguing, it 
is not a desirable reform. 
Returning to the hypothetical, what should be the tax 
consequence if, instead of a voluntary sale, X’s personal 
automobile were damaged in an accident or stolen, and X received 
no compensation for the loss? One reasonable approach is to treat 
X’s loss as part of X’s consumption (i.e., personal use to the 
exclusion of others) of the automobile, and so deny any deduction 
for the loss – that is, “part of the cost of possessing an asset is the 
risk that it might be damaged or stolen.”52 That approach would 
provide X with the same tax treatment he would have received if 
he had voluntarily sold the automobile for a loss.53 
Instead, a different, but also reasonable, approach would 
allow X to deduct a casualty or theft loss. A casualty or theft loss is 
different from a loss on a voluntary sale in that it is sudden, 
unexpected, and involuntarily forced on the taxpayer. The loss that 
a taxpayer incurs from an accident or theft does not look like a 
consumption of the item; to the contrary, it can be viewed as 
depriving the taxpayer of the use or consumption of the asset. For 
 
52 Kahn, supra note 34, at 37. 
53 The Joint Committee of Taxation clearly takes this view of 
casualty and theft losses as the deduction is listed in the tax 
expenditure budget. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, ___ 
Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 
____ (Comm. Print __). See also Kahn, supra note 34, at 37.   
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example, consider the plight of an employee who collects his pay 
in cash and is promptly mugged by a thief who takes the cash. It is 
difficult to view the employee as having consumed the stolen cash 
in the ordinary sense of that term.54 
Yet, a loss attributable to sudden and unexpected outside 
forces does bear some similarity to a loss attributable to outside 
forces that impacted negatively on the market value of an asset, 
and no deduction is allowed for losses attributable to market 
fluctuations. It would not be unreasonable to treat both of those 
losses the same and deny a deduction for both. But, it also would 
not be unreasonable to focus on the differences between market 
fluctuation losses and casualty losses and make some tax 
 
54 Without a casualty and theft deduction, the tax system would 
treat the employee whose cash was stolen the same as another 
employee with the same pay who is able to safely deposit his 
earnings into the bank and spend it on whatever he chooses. As 
noted by Professor Kaplow, the deduction will not put the two 
taxpayers on equal footing ex ante. In order to do so, the 
government would have to transfer funds to the employee in order 
to compensate for the theft. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as 
Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions 
and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 1485, 1492-93 (1991) (“If one wished to provide fully equal 
treatment to these precasualty equals, it would be necessary to 
make a transfer from the fortunate to the unfortunate that 
compensated completely for the latter’s losses...To accomplish this 
transfer through the tax system, instead, a 100% credit rather than 
a deduction would be necessary, with taxes on each income class 
raised sufficiently to cover the costs.”) However, contrary to 
Professor Kaplow’s inference, the purpose of the deduction is not 
to make the unfortunate employee whole, but instead is meant to 
reflect the fact that because of the differences in their net wealth 
position, the two taxpayers should not be taxed the same. The 
deduction accomplishes that goal.  
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allowance for the latter. Congress determined that the consumption 
element of a casualty or theft loss was too significant to allow a 
full deduction for it, but the nature of that type of loss did not 
warrant ignoring it for tax purposes. So, Congress adopted a 
middle ground. It allowed a deduction for casualty and theft losses 
of personal use property, but it imposed severe limitations on the 
amount that can be deducted.  Indeed, the limitations are so severe 
that most taxpayers who suffer such losses will not qualify for any 
deduction at all.  
Code section 165(c)(3) allows a deduction for “losses of 
property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction 
entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”55 The taxpayer’s loss 
is the lesser of the item’s decline in value or the taxpayer’s basis in 
the item.56 These losses are sometimes referred to as “personal 
casualty losses.”57 The limitations on those deductions include: 
1. No deduction is allowable to the extent that the taxpayer 
is reimbursed for the loss or has a reasonable prospect of 
being reimbursed.58 
55 A deduction for certain casualties was included in the first 
income tax act of 1913. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 
Stat. 167.  
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1). 
57 I.R.C, § 165(h)(3)(B). 
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2). 
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2. For each casualty or theft, no deduction is allowable for 
the first $100 of loss from each event.59 The excess amount 
can be deducted without restrictions only to the extent that 
the taxpayer has personal casualty gains60 that year. The 
excess of a taxpayer’s personal casualty losses for a year 
(minus the $100 floor) over the taxpayer’s personal 
casualty gains for that year is sometimes referred to as the 
“net personal casualty loss.”61 The restrictions on the 
deduction of a net personal casualty loss are described 
below. 
3. A taxpayer’s net personal casualty loss is deductible only 
to the extent that it exceeds 10 percent of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income.62 In addition, the deductible net 
personal casualty loss (i.e., the amount in excess of 10 
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income) is 
characterized as an itemized deduction (but not as a 
miscellaneous itemized deduction) and is thereby subjected 
to the limitations placed on that category of deductions. 
 
59 I.R.C. § 165(h)(1). 
60 “Personal casualty gains” are defined as any “recognized gain 
from any involuntary conversion of property….arising from fire, 
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.” I.R.C. § 
165(h)(3)(A). 
61 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) uses the term “net casualty loss,” but the 
author has chosen to use “net personal casualty loss” for greater 
clarity.  
62 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A).  
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Returning to the situation that began this discussion in 
which a taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property, the 
same considerations that apply to a voluntary sale apply here as 
well. It is appropriate that Congress excludes from income the 
amount of the compensation that does not exceed the taxpayer’s 
basis in the damaged property since that amount is properly 
characterized as a return of capital. This exclusion conforms to the 
well established principle that a return of one’s capital is not 
taxable. The damages received are not income to the extent of the 
taxpayer’s basis because the dollars received are treated as a 
replacement of the dollars the taxpayer is deemed to have invested 
in the property that were lost due to the casualty or theft. Since the  
cash reimbursement effectively constitutes a withdrawal by the 
taxpayer of that amount of his investment in the property, the 
taxpayer’s basis is reduced accordingly.63 That reduction does not 
constitute a deferral of income because the value of the property 
has correspondingly declined.   
If the taxpayer collects insurance for the damaged or stolen 
property pursuant to an insurance contract, instead of receiving a 
payment from the wrongdoer, the insurance proceeds are not 
included in income to the extent of the taxpayer’s basis unless the 
 
63 See Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76. 
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taxpayer had previously taken a deduction for that loss.64 Insurance 
proceeds are received pursuant to a contract for reimbursement of a 
loss, and are not income to the extent they merely replace the lost 
investment in the damaged or stolen property. Since the insurance 
proceeds provide the taxpayer with cash in hand in place of part or 
all of his investment in the property, the taxpayer’s basis in the 
property is reduced accordingly. 
It is true that there is a superficial equivalence between 
excluding the taxpayer’s recovery and allowing a full deduction for 
the loss – a deduction that is not allowed to unreimbursed 
taxpayers who are subject to severe restrictions on deductibility.65 
However, as already noted, the policy of excluding returns of 
capital is entrenched in the tax system, and the conflicting 
principle of parallelism is not strong enough to outweigh that 
policy. Similarly, in the view of Congress, the reason for denying a 
full deduction to a casualty or theft loss because of its points of 
 
64 In their casebook, Professors Dodge, Fleming and Geier note 
that the receipt of insurance proceeds raises some different 
considerations from those that apply to a tortfeasor’s payments. 
Nevertheless, they agree that the amount that does not exceed basis 
should be excluded, and the author concurs. See DODGE, FLEMING 
& GEIER, supra note 30, at 251-53.  
65 A possible justification for imposing a limitation on the 
deduction of such losses is a concern over the genuineness and 
extent of the claimed loss. The author gives little credence to that 
suggestion because limitations are a poor vehicle for dealing with 
that concern – that is, the limitations are overinclusive in that they 
also apply to genuine losses and are underinclusive in that they 
allow a deduction for an improper claim to the extent that they 
exceed the statutory limits.   
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contact with personal consumption outweigh the principle of 
parallelism, and so the latter principle is not strong enough to 
justify allowing a full deduction. One might disagree with the 
weight given by Congress to those conflicting principles in 
choosing between them, but the author does not see how the 
Congressional choice can be seen to be unreasonable. To the 
contrary, although it is a difficult issue, the author deems the 
Congressional solution to be a valid compromise between two 
polar positions.66 
B.  Physical Injury 
Returning now to the tax law’s nonparallel treatment of 
taxpayers who suffer physical injuries that was noted earlier in this 
article, you will recall that compensatory damages received for a 
physical injury generally are excluded from the income of the 
injured party by Code section 104(a)(2), but no deduction is 
allowed an injured party for uncompensated personal injuries.67 Is 
there a justification for that treatment? 
Initially, one might inquire as to what reasons there might 
be for excluding compensatory damages for physical injuries from 
income. A person typically has no basis (i.e., no dollar investment) 
 
66 The author finds the case for some deduction stronger for loss of 
property due to theft then for casualty losses. See Kahn, supra note 
34, at 37-40. 
67 If the injured party incurred medical expenses, that amount can 
be deductible subject to restrictions. I.R.C. § 213.  
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in his bodily parts68; and so, if the same treatment that applies to 
compensation received for damage to or loss of personal use 
property were adopted, the entire amount of the compensation 
received for a physical injury would be included in income. 
Congress has never stated its reasons for providing an exclusion 
for physical injury damages even though that exclusion has been in 
the statutory tax law in one form or another since 191969 and has 
undergone Congressional modifications from time to time.70 
Commentators have speculated as to the likely reasons for that 
exclusion, and the author has adopted the following rationales that 
appear the most persuasive.71 
68 Moreover, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing his basis 
and it is doubtful that many persons could satisfy that burden of 
proof in the case of human capital. In the unlikely event that a 
taxpayer could prove that he had some basis in his human capital, 
but could not show the exact amount, the taxpayer might be 
allowed a basis; but, even then, the amount likely would be 
minimal after making all assumptions in favor of the government – 
an application of the so-called “Cohan rule.” See Cohan v. 
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Estate of Goldstein v. 
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1032, 1037-38 (1960). 
69 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. 65-254, section 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 
1057, 1066 (1919). The early history of the statutory exclusion has 
been set forth in several articles. See, e.g., Margaret Henning, 
Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and 
Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAW. 783, 784-95 (1992). 
70 In its most recent amendment in 1996, Congress limited the 
exclusion to compensatory damages for physical injuries and made 
clear that punitive damages are taxable. Small Business Protection  
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, section 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 
(1996)  
71 The rationales adopted in this article was propounded in Douglas 
Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: 
To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 348-356 (1995). 
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The loss suffered from a physical injury is sometimes 
referred to as a loss of “human capital.” The physical attribute that 
was lost (e.g., a damaged or severed limb, a loss of sight or 
hearing) is not something that the victim normally would sell in a 
commercial market. In the author’s view, the tax law is aimed at 
commercial transactions; and its application to non-commercial 
transactions should be viewed with some skepticism. If income is 
received in a non-commercial transaction, the absence of a 
commercial source is not sufficient to preclude the tax law from 
reaching that income and taxing it. But, if there are other 
considerations favoring an exclusion, the non-commercial nature 
of the transaction can be an added factor weighing in favor of the 
exclusion. If a non-commercial personal attribute is voluntarily 
placed in the commercial market, the tax law should address it. But 
if a victim’s non-commercial personal attribute is involuntarily 
converted to cash because of a tort, then that event can legitimately 
be viewed as outside of the commercial zone in which the tax law 
typically operates and that fact combined with other considerations 
that favor exclusion may be enough to justify it.  
Obviously, while the view that there is a non-commercial 
zone in which the tax law does not always operate is a datum 
favoring an exclusion of compensatory damages for a physical 
injury, it disfavors allowing a deduction for an uncompensated 
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personal injury. This disfavor of a deduction is a factor for not 
allowing one, but it is not conclusive in itself or even entitled to 
much weight. Deductions have been allowed in other areas for 
non-commercial events such as costs incurred because of an illness 
or losses from a casualty to or theft of personal use property.72 
When there are competing considerations that warrant taking a 
non-commercial event into account, the tax law appropriately has 
done so. As we shall see, there are other stronger reasons for 
denying the deduction. Let us first review the considerations 
supporting an exclusion.  
The tax law reflects a policy of allowing relief for 
taxpayers whose property is involuntarily converted into cash. 
Code section 1033 permits a deferral (or roll-over) of all or part of 
the income realized on an involuntary conversion if property that is 
similar or related in service or use to the converted property is 
purchased within a specified period of time. In the case of a 
physical injury, however, it is not feasible for the victim to 
purchase a replacement for what was lost. So, the approach 
adopted for property in Code section 1033 is not available for 
physical injuries.  The exclusion from income of physical injury 
damages could be the relief that Congress adopted given that the 
choice of a deferral through a roll-over is not readily available for 
 
72 I.R.C. §§ 213 and 165(c)(3).  
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this type of involuntary conversion. It is doubtful that concern over 
the involuntariness of the conversion of the victim’s personal 
attribute is sufficient by itself to warrant granting an exclusion, but 
that consideration can be added to others so that their cumulative 
effect is sufficient to induce Congress to grant the exclusion. 
Another consideration favoring exclusion is that taxing the 
victim on compensatory damages might cause a dramatic increase 
in the amount of damages awarded. Some of the added amount 
may not be collectible if it exceeds insurance coverage. In any 
event, Congress may not wish to have the tax laws be the engine 
that drives damage awards to dizzying heights. Note that the 
concern over higher damages award is not based on sympathy for 
tortfeasors. An increase in damage awards would cause an increase 
in insurance premiums that would be borne by much of the public. 
Moreover, the insurers would take into account the possibility that 
victims could be in high tax brackets, and that possibility would 
further impact the premiums charged.  
Another consideration is the appearance to the public that a 
tax on such compensatory damages would have. It is difficult to 
determine the dollar value of a lost personal attribute since 
personal attributes are not bought and sold in the market place.73 
73 The difficulty of valuing the loss incurred from an 
uncompensated physical injury is one factor in not providing a 
deduction. While that difficulty is not a sufficient obstacle by itself 
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Since the damaged or lost attribute cannot be replaced, dollars are 
the only means of compensating the victim, and the proper dollar 
substitute cannot be established with precise and scientific 
accuracy. The dollar amount awarded is merely a rough estimate of 
what will substitute for the loss that the victim suffered. The 
compensation is intended to put the victim back in roughly the 
same position he occupied before the accident, or as close to that 
as dollars can accomplish. It would be unseemly, even rapacious, 
for the government to take a portion of the funds that were given to 
make the victim whole and thereby leave the victim 
uncompensated for part of his loss. The government does not wish 
to be seen as a cold-hearted creditor capitalizing on the misfortune 
of others.  
As noted above, if damage awards were made taxable, the 
amount awarded might be increased to provide greater relief to the 
victim. However, it is unlikely that additional amounts will be 
awarded in all cases, and the amount of an additional award in a 
specific case will not necessarily be sufficient to offset the tax that 
the victim must pay.  
But, is it not equally unseemly for the government to give 
no deduction to a victim who is not compensated for her injury? 
Since the victim has no dollar investment (i.e., basis) in the lost 
 
to warrant denying a deduction, it is one consideration to be added 
to others that weigh against allowing a deduction. 
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attributes, there typically is nothing to deduct.74 The failure to 
provide a deduction for that loss does not have the rapacious 
character that depriving a victim of a significant portion of her 
compensation has.75 
A majority of the public likely would react adversely to the 
government’s seizing any of a victim’s compensation even though 
little or no objection has been raised to the government’s failure to 
provide victims with a tax deduction. This difference in attitude 
and perception is referred to as a “framing effect.”76 For example, 
 
74 There are instances in the Code where a taxpayer is allowed to 
take a deduction beyond his investment. For example, the Code 
allows a taxpayer to deduct the fair market value of some types of 
property donated to charity. On account of this rule, a taxpayer 
may deduct all or a portion of the unrealized appreciation of an 
asset. See Treas. Reg. ' 1.170A-1(c) and I.R.C. ' 170(e). However, 
this is clearly a subsidy provision intended to encourage charitable 
giving. See Kahn, supra note 34, at 46-47. Another subsidy 
provision is the percentage depletion rules that, in some cases, 
allow a taxpayer to take a deduction greater than his investment. 
See I.R.C. ' 611. Even Congress expressed its concern that the 
percentage depletion provision does not contribute to the accurate 
measurement of a taxpayer’s income by listing it as a tax 
preference item under the alternative minimum tax system. I.R.C. 
' 57(a)(1).  
75 Note that the Code does provide a deduction for any medical 
expenses that the injured taxpayer incurs. I.R.C. § 213.  
76 See Edward Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing 
Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the 
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 807-
811 (2005). Professor Zelinsky cites other commentators who have 
noted the existence of a framing effect, and he cites experiments 
that have demonstrated that that effect does exist. See also Edward 
J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation: 
Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 
JOUR. OF ECON. PSYCHOLOGY 679 (2004) (available online at 
www.sciencedirect.com).  
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Professor Zelinsky has suggested that the “framing effect” may 
explain why the publication of so-called Tax Expenditure Budgets 
has had such little effect on the adoption or maintenance of tax 
expenditures.77 It would seem that even if the view that exclusions 
are the equivalent of a deduction were publicized, the public would 
not regard them as interchangeable. This “framing effect” is a 
factor in the existence of many of the nonparallel treatments of the 
tax law. 
The tax law does not exclude all compensatory damages for 
personal injuries. A victim of defamation or discrimination 
currently is taxed on the damages received for his injuries since he 
did not incur a physical injury. Why has there not been a hue and 
cry raised in opposition to the government’s taking a significant 
portion of those damages?  The author believes that the 
explanation is that the public’s depth of sympathy for a victim who 
suffers a serious physical injury (such as a loss of a limb) is far 
greater than it is for the victim of non-physical injuries. That is not 
to say that there is no sympathy for victims who do not incur 
physical injuries, but only that the depth of sympathy is far less. 
Moreover, the compensatory damages received for non-physical 
injuries are generally regarded as substitutes for lost income as 
 
77 Id. at 823. For a critical view of the tax expenditure concept, see 
Kahn, supra note 34. See also Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. 
Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical Review, 54 TAX 
NOTES 1661 (1992).  
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contrasted to a damaged or lost body part. The taking of even a 
significant portion of those damages does not have the rapacious 
character that does the taking of damages for physical injuries. 
The cumulative effect of the several considerations 
described above makes a compelling case for an exclusion.78 None 
of those considerations apply to the granting of a deduction. But, 
 
78 One problem with allowing the exclusion of compensatory 
physical injury damages is that, in settling a dispute, the parties 
may characterize as compensatory damages payments made for an 
entirely different purpose (this general issue can arise around any 
exclusion). For example, part of the agreed-upon payment could 
represent punitive damages, which are included in income. I.R.C. '
104(a)(2). The wrong-doer generally has little at stake in whether 
the damages are labeled compensatory or punitive and thus may be 
willing to classify the entire amount as compensatory in exchange 
for a lower overall payment. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 
95-96. It may be difficult to show that the payments were made for 
another purpose, but if the amount paid is obviously excessive, the 
Service and the courts will re-characterize the payment and include 
some of it in income. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 34 
(5th Cir. 1997).  
The possibility of false characterization of the nature of a 
payment is not limited to disguised punitive damage payments. 
The entire settlement, or a portion thereof, could be made because 
of the nuisance aspect of a claim, and so could be made to end a 
dispute and the bad publicity generated by it. It is especially 
difficult to identify that situation, but in rare cases, a court may 
make that determination and include part of the payment in 
income. See Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-329. This 
case involved a photographer who was kicked during a basketball 
game by Dennis Rodman, a professional basketball player. The 
Tax Court had to determine whether the $200,000 settlement 
between Rodman and the taxpayer was taxable to Amos or whether 
it was excluded as compensation for a physical injury under Code 
§ 104. This was an easy case for the Service to argue that a portion, 
if not all, of the compensation paid to Amos should be taxable 
since the settlement contract itself expressly provided that a 
portion of the proceeds was for the taxpayer’s agreement to, 
among other things, not defame Rodman or disclose the existence 
of the agreement. Id.
42
parallelism is a principle that does favor allowing a deduction, and 
so what considerations negate that factor? To some extent, the non-
commercial zone consideration disfavors the allowance of a 
deduction, but not strongly so. Similarly, the administrative 
difficulty in placing a dollar value on uncompensated personal 
losses militates against allowing a deduction, but not conclusively. 
The major reason that no deduction is allowed is that no dollar 
investment was lost and the goal of parallelism is not a strong 
enough consideration to promote a deduction when there are no 
other factors that favor it. This suggests that parallelism is not a 
major goal for those that write the tax laws and that it is not a 
sufficient policy in itself to affect tax decisions. Nonparallel 
treatment may offend those who like a more tidy system, but it has 
been given little weight by tax policy makers, and, in the view of 
the author, justifiably so. The framing effect is one reason that 
exclusions and deductions have not been regarded as identical so 
that different tax treatment has not offended many. Consider the 
example of the refund of the overpayment of an income tax that 
was discussed earlier in this article.79 The lack of parallel treatment 
in that case is unlikely to offend more than a small minority of 
persons. That suggests that while parallel treatment has an appeal 
 
79 See supra Section III of the article.  
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in the abstract, it has little influence on the evaluation of specific 
provisions. 
C. Clark v. Commissioner 
The third example of nonparallel treatment arises from a 
tax case, rather than a tax provision. In fact, this is one area where, 
if the Service were given a choice, it would likely opt to provide 
for parallel treatment by denying an exclusion for the reimbursed 
taxpayer. 
Clark v. Commissioner80, a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals81 
case, involved a couple that, based on the advice of tax counsel, 
filed a joint return for their 1932 tax year. In 1934, the Clarks were 
audited and the Service contended that, based on errors in the 
return, the Clarks owed over $30,000 more in federal income 
taxes. After discovering the error, the Clarks also learned that if 
they had filed separate returns, rather than filing jointly, they 
would have owed almost $20,000 less in income taxes; and they 
were not permitted to change their filing status. 
The tax counsel who prepared the Clarks’ return, admitting 
the error, transferred to the Clarks an amount equal to the 
overpayment. The Service contended that this payment was 
 
80 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4. The Service initially 
nonacquiesced in Clark (1939-2 C.B. 45) but, eighteen years later, 
changed to an acquiesce.  
81 The current Tax Court was originally known as the United States 
Board of Tax Appeals.  
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income to the Clarks. The Clarks argued that the “payment 
constituted compensation for damages or loss caused by the error 
of tax counsel, and that [they] therefore realized no income from 
its receipt in 1934.”82 
One interesting aspect of this case is that, whichever way 
the court ruled, the policy would fail in some manner the principle 
of horizontal equity. As set out in a hypothetical by Professors 
Klein, Bankman and Shaviro in their casebook83, assume we have 
three taxpayers. One individual, A, hires a good tax preparer and 
therefore does not overpay his income taxes. Another individual, 
B, hires a bad preparer, and overpays by $10,000. Finally, a third 
individual, C, hires a bad preparer and also overpays by $10,000. 
However, five years later, C noticed the error and, like the Clark 
case, the preparer agreed to reimburse C for the overpayment. If 
the $10,000 payment is excluded from C’s income, then C will be 
treated similarly to A, i.e., it would be as if C had received good 
advice from the beginning. However, such treatment would fail 
horizontal equity when we compare B and C. By excluding the 
$10,000 payment, C and B are taxed equally even though C 
received $10,000 more income.  
 
82 Clark, 40 B.T.A. 333, 335. The court held for the taxpayers. For 
a thorough analysis of the Clark case concluding that it was 
correctly decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, see Zelenak, supra 
note 4.  
83 KLEIN, BANKMAN & SHAVIRO, supra note 9, at 123.  
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If we tax the payment to C, horizontal equity is met when 
we compare B and C, but not when we compare C and A. Either C 
must be overtaxed as compared to A or undertaxed as compared to 
B. While discussing this hypothetical in their casebook, Professors 
Klein, Bankman and Shaviro note: “We cannot avoid committing 
one or the other of these two ‘errors’ (of the overall tax system, not 
the decision-maker) given that [A] and [B] are not being taxed 
correctly relative to each other.”84 This scenario illustrates why 
horizontal equity often is not a useful tool for policy analysis. The 
resolution of the question of equity requires a determination of the 
party to whom the comparison is to be made. In the above case, 
there is no reason to favor either A or B as the proper object of 
comparison and yet equality cannot be obtained with both unless a 
deduction were allowable for a tax overpayment. There are good 
reasons not to allow a deduction for tax overpayments.85 
The court in Clark held for the taxpayer,86 thereby 
committing the “error” that Clark was undertaxed as compared to 
others who overpaid but were not able to recover anything from 
their preparer. This decision created nonparallel treatment for these 
 
84 Id. See also Zelenak, supra note 4, at 388-89.  
85 See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31 (hypothetical 
involving taxpayer Y). 
86 The court’s decision in Clark seems to rely on cases that were 
later repudiated but the result in the case could be justified on a 
different ground which may have lead to the Service’s eventual 
acquiescence.  
46
types of expenditures. That is, the court provided an exclusion if 
the taxpayer is reimbursed for their overpayment, but no deduction 
is allowable if the taxpayer is not reimbursed.  
The Service, although it did acquiesce to the Clark 
decision,87 subsequently attempted to narrow the scope of the case 
as much as possible. For example, in 1992, the Service published 
Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 9211015. The ruling described a fact 
pattern where, because of a CPA firm’s negligence, an investment 
fund failed to qualify as a regulated investment company (RIC) for 
certain tax years. This failure lead to the investment fund’s paying 
higher federal income taxes as well as other penalties and interest. 
The fund was reimbursed by the CPA’s insurer for those expenses. 
The issue was whether this reimbursement was income to the 
investment fund. 
The Service described the issue as whether the 
reimbursement was a recovery of lost profits and therefore taxable 
to the fund or a replacement of the fund’s capital which would not 
be includible in income. As noted by the Service “[p]ayment by the 
one causing a loss that does  no more than restore a taxpayer to the 
position he or she was in before the loss was incurred is not 
 
87 1957-1 C.B. 4. See also Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 45 
(excluding a reimbursement of tax overpayment caused by a tax 
preparer’s error).  
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includible in gross income because there is no economic gain.”88 
The Service then concluded that this reimbursement should be 
classified as a return of capital and ruled that the investment fund 
would not have to include the amount in income.89 
However, in 1997, the Service reversed its position. In a 
new ruling, the Service specifically revoked its earlier ruling in 
PLR 9211015.90 Attempting to distinguish Clark, the Service 
stated: 
The indemnity payment that Fund received as a 
reimbursement for the additional federal income 
taxes and associated penalties and interest it 
incurred are distinguishable from the indemnity 
payments in Clark…the preparers’ error in filing 
returns or claiming refunds caused the taxpayer to 
pay more than their minimum proper federal 
income tax liabilities based on the underlying 
transactions for the year in question. In this case, 
however, the CPA firm’s error altered the 
underlying entity status of Fund. Fund incurred the 
minimum proper federal income liability as a 
Subchapter C corporation during the period it did 
not qualify as a RIC. The CPA firm’s 
reimbursement… was not made to compensate 
Fund for a tax liability in excess of Fund’s proper 
federal tax liability for the tax years relating to the 
firm’s negligence. Instead, the reimbursement was a 
payment of Fund’s proper tax liability.91 
88 PLR 9211015. 
89 Id.
90 PLR 9743035. See also PLR 9833007. 
91 PLR 9743035. See Old Colony Trust Company v. 
Commissioner, 279 US 716 (1929) and Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 for 
the position that a person’s payment of a taxpayer’s tax liability is 
income to the taxpayer.   
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 This reasoning is weak, at best. The Clarks also paid the 
correct amount of liability according to their filing status; although 
it is true that the accountant’s error in Clark did not change the 
underlying structure of the Clark family. In the PLR, two adverse 
parties determined that the accountant’s mistake caused the 
taxpayer to overpay their federal tax liability. While qualifying as a 
RIC may have required the taxpayer to incur expenses that it did 
not pay on account of the mistake, that fact merely should have 
reduced the size of the taxpayer’s damage and accordingly reduced 
the amount of the accountant’s liability. If the parties neglected to 
take any such additional expenses into account in setting the 
amount to be paid, it nevertheless should not affect the tax 
treatment of the payment by the CPA firm’s insurer because the 
amount of damages was set by parties at arm’s length and should 
be respected by the Service.  
 In the author’s opinion, the Clark reasoning should also 
apply to the PLR facts. The accountant is simply repaying the 
taxpayer for lost capital based on the accountant’s error.92 This 
should be treated similarly to payments made for causing damage 
to property, i.e., unless and until the accountant’s payment exceeds 
the taxpayer’s “basis” in his tax payment (i.e., the amount that the 
 
92 To the extent that the payment represented interest on the 
accountant’s obligation or was a return of a previously deducted 
item (such as the accountant’s fee) it would be taxable. Rev. Rul. 
57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23.  
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taxpayer paid), the payment by the accountant should be treated 
similarly to a return of capital and thus nontaxable. That is not to 
say that the taxpayer actually has a “basis”. One can have a basis 
only in tangible or intangible property. But, basis is comprised of 
dollars that have been invested; and so the replacement of dollars 
is equivalent to a replacement of basis, both of which represent a 
return of capital.   
Professor Zelenak maintains, in his article on Clark,93 that a 
reimbursement of income tax liability can be excluded only to the 
extent that the tax payment can be classified as a “loss.”  He 
maintains that otherwise the repayment is taxable under the Old 
Colony94 doctrine. The author does not agree that the taxpayer’s 
tax payment has to be classified as a loss in order for the 
reimbursement to be excluded. In the author’s view, it is sufficient 
that the party making the reimbursement (the accountant95 in the 
letter ruling) made an error that caused the taxpayer to pay out 
dollars that he would not have had to pay if the accountant had not 
made an error.  It is sufficient that there is a nexus between the 
third party’s error and the amount of payment that was reimbursed. 
It should not matter that the taxpayer actually owed the tax he paid; 
the significant fact is that the third party’s error caused the 
 
93 Zelenak, supra note 4.  
94 Old Colony Trust Company v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716.  
95 While the reimbursement was made by the accountant’s insurer, 
it was made on behalf of the accountant. 
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taxpayer to have a greater tax liability than he would have incurred 
if the third party had not made the error. 
 Consider this example: B owes a fine to the state of X that 
is due to be paid on a specified date. A fine is not a deductible 
expense.96 B’s attorney, T, holds a sizeable amount of B’s funds in 
a fiduciary account. B requests T to use some of those funds to pay 
the fine, and T undertakes to make a timely payment to the state. T 
fails to make the payment on time, and so B is fined an additional 
$20,000 for not paying on time. The additional fine is not 
deductible.97 B properly owes the additional fine to the state. 
Because the additional fine was attributable to T’s error, T 
reimburses B for the additional $20,000 fine that B incurred. The 
fact that B was liable for the additional fine should not cause the 
reimbursement to be income to B. The reimbursement is replacing 
dollars that B would not have had to pay to the state if T had done 
his job properly.  
 PLR 9728052 presents a variation on this theme. In that 
ruling, the taxpayer had agreed upon a settlement with his former 
wife to pay her an annual amount for a specified number of years. 
The settlement agreement provided that if the wife died before the 
payment period expired, the taxpayer would continue to make 
payments to her estate. This provision disqualified the payments 
 
96 I.R.C. § 162(f), and Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p). 
97 Id.
51
made to the wife for alimony treatment and made them 
nondeductible.98 The taxpayer agreed to this settlement on the 
erroneous advice of his attorney that the payments to the wife 
would be deductible. The taxpayer sought indemnification from 
the attorney’s malpractice insurer for the additional taxes he 
incurred, and will incur in the future, because of the disallowance 
of the deduction that he had anticipated receiving. The Service 
ruled that since the taxpayer properly owes the taxes in question, 
any indemnification he receives from the attorney’s insurer will be 
included in his income. 
 Presumably, the taxpayer would not have executed an 
agreement providing for post mortem benefits to the wife if he had 
been correctly advised as to the tax consequences of that provision. 
However, the wife likely would have rejected an agreement 
without that provision unless the amount of the annual payments 
was increased.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine just 
how much the attorney’s error cost the taxpayer since one can only 
speculate as to what the terms of the final settlement would have 
been. In determining the amount of the taxpayer’s damages, any 
additional amounts that the taxpayer would have had to pay should 
be offset against the additional tax liability he incurred. In the view 
of the author, however, whatever figure the taxpayer and the 
 
98 I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D). 
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attorney’s insurer agree upon, regardless of whether it reflects 
offsetting costs that the taxpayer might have incurred, should be 
accepted by the Service because it will be the product of an arms- 
length agreement. There is no risk of collusion in this 
circumstance, and the bona fides of such an agreement are beyond 
question, since the insurer has no extrinsic motives (such as 
silencing the bad publicity that a dispute would bring to the 
attorney) for settling the issue.99 
In his article about the Clark issue, Professor Zelenak also 
discusses the question of how a tax reimbursement payment that is 
made pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement should be treated, and 
concludes that such payments should be taxed.100 While accepting 
much of what Professor Zelenak said in that article, the author 
comes to a different conclusion. A tax indemnity agreement is a 
guarantee of the tax treatment that a taxpayer will have in a 
transaction and an agreement to indemnify the taxpayer for any 
additional taxes incurred if the actual tax treatment is different 
from the one that was promised. A tax indemnity agreement can be 
granted in several distinct circumstances. It can be given by a seller 
to induce a buyer or investor to enter into a transaction. Or, a third 
party, such as a broker or promoter, could provide a prospective 
 
99 Even if the payment were made directly by the attorney, the 
possibility of collusion or ulterior motive is not significant enough 
to change the tax result.  
100 Zelenak, supra note 4, at 397.  
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buyer with a tax indemnity agreement for the same purpose. 
Indeed, an insurance company that has no connection to the 
investment could insure that the taxpayer will receive a specified 
tax treatment.101 Since Professor Zelenak focuses on a seller’s 
indemnification agreement, the author will discuss that situation 
first. 
 The Service currently treats tax indemnification payments 
that a taxpayer receives as income to the taxpayer, and Professor 
Zelenak concluded that the Service is correct in doing so.102 He 
argues that the additional tax that the taxpayer paid cannot be 
characterized as a loss because that would permit “private parties 
to manufacture a loss out of nothing with no regard to the actual 
nature of the asset in question, through the simple means of 
misrepresentation by the seller.”103 He points out that to exclude 
the tax reimbursement from income is to permit the parties to 
provide the investor with a tax-free return on his investment, 
thereby providing a benefit to the seller or the investor or both that 
they could not otherwise obtain. Before examining that contention, 
let us focus on the nature of a tax reimbursement payment. 
 As previously discussed, when a taxpayer receives a 
reimbursement from the person who caused the taxpayer to pay a 
 
101 See infra note 114.  
102 Zelenak, supra note 4, at 397. 
103 Id. at 398. 
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higher tax through that person’s error, the payment should be 
excluded from the taxpayer’s income as a damage payment to 
replace lost dollars. The situation is analogous to the receipt of 
damages for injury to property where the amount received is 
excluded from income to the extent it does not exceed the 
taxpayer’s basis, albeit the taxpayer’s basis is reduced by the 
reimbursement if the taxpayer still has the asset.104 But, a payment 
received pursuant to a tax indemnification agreement is on quite a 
different footing. Such a payment does not constitute damages paid 
for causing an injury. Instead, the payment is made under a 
contractual arrangement. How should that contractually mandated 
payment be treated for tax purposes?  Let us first consider the case 
of a seller-provided indemnification, and then consider a third 
party indemnification.  
 The payment that the taxpayer receives from the seller is 
made pursuant to a guarantee of the seller that was designed to 
induce the taxpayer to make the investment. In effect, the seller 
became an insurer, and the payment to the taxpayer can be seen as 
insurance proceeds. If a taxpayer who owned automobile insurance 
has his personal use automobile destroyed in a storm, and if the 
taxpayer does not qualify for a casualty deduction because of the 
insurance coverage, the insurance proceeds that are paid to the 
 
104 There is no meaningful reduction of the taxpayer’s basis if the 
asset in question was destroyed or was stolen and never recovered.  
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taxpayer are excluded from his income to the extent of his basis in 
the automobile.105 The “insurance” proceeds received under a tax 
indemnity contract should be treated similarly - i.e., they should be 
excluded from income to the extent they do not exceed the dollars 
that were “lost” by the taxpayer because of the additional tax 
payment. 
 Alternatively, the tax indemnity agreement can be viewed 
as an agreement by the seller to reduce the purchase price in the 
event that the tax treatment of the transaction is different from 
what the parties anticipated. In the case of a seller-provided tax 
indemnity, the reduction of purchase price characterization seems 
to be a better view than the insurance analogy since that is the true 
consequence of the seller’s refunding part of the purchase price to 
the purchaser. The additional tax that the purchaser had to pay is 
merely the measuring standard for the amount of purchase price to 
be refunded. 
 Regardless of which characterization is chosen, if the 
indemnification payment is excluded from the taxpayer’s income, 
it will reduce the cost of the transaction to him, which will mean a 
reduction of his basis or of his expenses. 
 
105 See supra note 39 and the text thereto. The payments will 
reduce the taxpayer’s basis in the automobile; but since the car was 
destroyed, the reduction of the taxpayer’s basis has no 
significance. 
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 Consider this analogous situation. K wishes to purchase a 
house as his personal residence, but deems the asking price to be 
too high because he will have to make extensive repairs if he 
purchases the house. The seller induces K to purchase the house by 
guaranteeing that the repairs will not exceed $20,000. K purchases 
the house, and makes the repairs which cost $35,000.  The seller 
then pays K $15,000 pursuant to the guarantee. K does not have 
income because of the receipt of that payment. The payment is a 
reduction of the cost of the house to K, and so reduces his basis.106 
In his article,107 contrary to the analysis above, Professor 
Zelenak makes a strong case for taxing tax indemnification 
payments that are made by a seller. He illustrated the objectionable 
feature of an exclusion from income by the following example.108 
X wishes to sell its bond109 to F. The bond will pay $100 on 
maturity. F will buy X’s bond for $100 only if it will provide F 
with a 10% return after taxes. All of F’s income will be taxed at a 
flat 20% rate.110 If the interest payable on the bond is taxable, X 
could meet F’s demand by providing an annual payment of $12.50 
on the bond, which would provide F with an after-tax return of 
 
106 The reduction of basis may not be of any consequence because 
of the exclusion from income provided by Code § 121 for a 
specified amount of gain on the sale of a principal residence. 
107 Zelenak, supra note 4.  
108 Id. at 398-99. 
109 The issuing of a bond is a form of borrowing money. 
110 An unrealistic assumption that is adopted for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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$10.111 X would thereby pay 12.5% on the bond, and F would net a 
10% return after taxes.  
 Instead, X issues F a bond for $100 that pays F only $10 
per year, but X guarantees that the interest payments will not be 
included in F’s income. If the interest is taxed by the Service, X 
will reimburse F for any tax he incurs.  The interest F received is 
taxed, and F pays a tax of $2 per year thereon. Pursuant to the 
indemnification agreement, X pays F $2 per year. If the $2 
indemnification payment that F receives is excluded from his 
income, F will have his desired 10% after-tax return; but Professor 
Zelenak states that the cost to X will be only $12 per year ($10 
interest plus the $2 indemnification). So, instead of X’s paying 
12.5% on the bond, X will pay only 12%.   
 If instead, the $2 indemnification payment to F were 
taxable, X would have to pay F $2.50 to provide F with $2 after 
taxes. In that case, X would pay the same 12.5% that X would have 
paid if X had acknowledged from the beginning that the interest on 
the bond would be taxable. 
 In fact, however, even if the tax indemnification payments 
are excluded from income, X may have to pay more than 12% on 
the bond. If excluded from income, each $2 indemnification 
 
111 Eighty percent of $12.50 is $10. 
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payment made to F will reduce F’s basis in the bond.112 When the 
bond matures (unless F dies before then so that the basis of the 
bond will be stepped up under Code section 1014), F will 
recognize gain on the difference between the $100 proceeds that F 
will receive and F’s adjusted basis in the bond. Pursuant to the 
indemnification agreement, X will then pay F the amount of tax 
that F incurred on that gain. That additional payment by X will 
increase the total amount it pays on the bond to constitute an 
annualized rate of something more than 12% of the original $100 
purchase price. This potential additional cost to X does not 
eliminate the tax advantages of the arrangement, but it does reduce 
them. 
 Note that the tax benefit created by the above-described 
arrangement need not be captured exclusively by the seller. The 
benefit could be divided between the parties by the seller’s paying 
a slightly higher interest rate on the bond. That possibility 
increases the risk that parties will enter into a collusive 
arrangement to take advantage of this tax reduction. 
 What does this problem tell us about the question of 
whether tax indemnification payments by sellers should be 
excluded from income? Not all seller indemnification agreements 
 
112 Under a transactional analysis, the payment is a reduction of the 
price that F paid for the bond and thus reduces his basis. See supra 
text accompanying note 106.  
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are vulnerable to this abuse. Does the fact that some agreements 
will provide a tax benefit, and that some parties will make a tax 
indemnification arrangement in bad faith to obtain a tax benefit, 
mean that all seller-made tax indemnity payments should be taxed? 
 The answer to that question is in doubt. The problem, so 
ably described by Professor Zelenak, shows that there is a strong 
policy reason to tax such indemnification payments. While it might 
be possible to distinguish potentially abusive indemnification 
arrangements from those that are not, that would impose a great 
burden on the Service to identify the different situations. The better 
rule is to apply the same approach to all seller-made tax 
indemnification agreements - either tax the payments or exclude 
them.  
 On the other hand, the problem described by Professor 
Zelenak, while a significant consideration, is only one of several 
factors to be considered.  There also exist strong reasons not to tax 
the indemnification payments and to treat them as a reduction of 
the purchaser’s basis - i.e., the transactional view that the 
arrangement constitutes a reduction of the purchase price, and the 
insurance analogy. Perhaps, the issue should be resolved on the 
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basis of empirical studies to determine whether the potential abuse 
of the arrangement actually occurs to a significant extent.113 
Note that the possibility of abusive manipulation by parties 
to obtain tax benefits is mitigated by the vulnerability of such 
arrangements to be struck down as shams. The difficulty that the 
Service would encounter in identifying and prosecuting those 
arrangements that are shams renders that remedy of less practical 
value. But, if the occurrences of sham transactions are rare, the 
remedy of disregarding them may be adequate. 
 Let us now turn to consider a tax indemnity provision that 
is made by a third party (a broker for example) rather than by a 
seller.114 There seems to be no potential for abuse in that case, and 
so the indemnification payments should be excluded from income. 
 
113 It would be difficult to determine the extent to which sham 
transactions are taking place because of the secretive nature of 
such transactions. But, at the present time, it is not possible to 
obtain any empirical information since the Service’s position that 
tax indemnity payments are taxable has not been challenged.  
114 There are two types of parties who may be willing to make an 
indemnification agreement. First, there is a promoter who has an 
interest in seeing that the deal is accomplished. Second, there is a 
third-party insurance provider who may examine a proposed deal 
and provide tax indemnity insurance (sometimes referred to as 
transaction tax risk insurance). See Kylie D. Logue, The Problem 
of Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, CITE. See 
also Kenneth A. Geary, New Opportunities for Tax Lawyers: 
Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (2004). Professor 
Logue briefly mentioned the tax treatment issue (both in terms of 
whether the premiums are deductible and whether the proceeds are 
excluded). Logue at n.86.  Professor Logue did not resolve the 
question of whether the receipt of insurance proceeds in such cases 
will be income to the insured, and he characterized that as a 
difficult issue. Id.
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In most cases, the payments will reduce the taxpayer’s basis or 
reduce expenses the taxpayer incurred. 
 Return to the hypothetical above where a buyer was 
induced to purchase a residence by a guarantee that necessary 
repairs would not exceed $20,000. In the hypothetical, the 
guarantee was made by the seller. Instead, change the facts so that 
the guarantee was made by the real estate agent with whom the 
house was listed. The repairs actually cost $35,000, and so the real 
estate agent pays the buyer $15,000 pursuant to the 
indemnification agreement. In the author’s view, the payment will 
not be included in the buyer’s income, but it will reduce his basis 
in the house. 
 Consider the Tax Court’s decision in Freedom Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Commissioner.115 In that case, the taxpayer was induced by 
a broker to purchase four businesses even though the taxpayer did 
not wish to own one of them. The broker convinced the taxpayer to 
make the purchase by promising to sell the unwanted business or 
to pay the taxpayer $100,000 if the broker were unable to make the 
sale.  The broker was unable to make the sale, and so paid 
$100,000 to the taxpayer per its guarantee.  The court treated the 
$100,000 payment as a reduction of the purchase price paid by the 
taxpayer for the business, and so excluded it from income. While it 
 
115 36 T.C.M. 1755 (1977). 
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is unusual for a payment by a third party to be treated as a 
reduction of the purchase price paid to another, the broker was so 
connected to the purchase of the business that the court deemed his 
payment to the taxpayer as part of the overall purchase transaction. 
This approach could well apply to the scenario concerning K’s 
purchase of a residence described above so that K’s basis in the 
house would be reduced by the $15,000 payment he received. 
 Returning to the tax indemnity payment, it seems that the 
payment might reduce the taxpayer’s basis in an investment that 
was the subject of the arrangement or it might reduce costs that the 
taxpayer incurred in the program, but it would not be taxable to the 
taxpayer when received. In short, it should be treated the same as 
an insurance payment.116 The question is whether the payment 
should be treated as a return of part of the taxes the taxpayer paid, 
which would have no effect on the taxpayer’s basis in any 
property, or whether it should be treated as a reduction of the 
amount of the taxpayer’s investment or costs incurred in the 
transaction that he was induced to undertake? The purpose of the 
broker’s indemnity agreement was to induce the taxpayer to 
engage in a transaction, and so the payment can be seen as a 
reduction of the costs the taxpayer incurred in that transaction. 
 
116 A payment by an insurer pursuant to an insurance contract 
should be given the same tax treatment – i.e., not income to the 
insured.  
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That approach would conform to the Tax Court’s decision in the 
Freedom Newspapers case described above.117 
An alternative characterization of the payment is to treat it 
as a reduction of any fee the payor may have received from the 
taxpayer in the transaction. If so, the payment would be income to 
the taxpayer only to the extent that the taxpayer had previously 
deducted the fee (that is, income under the tax benefit rule).118 This 
characterization would be proper if the guarantee made by the 
payor was a sham, and the parties knew from the outset that the 
payment would be made.119 If the guarantee was bona fide (i.e., not 
a sham), it is a close question which of the two possible 
characterizations is better. In the author’s view, the better 
characterization is to treat the guarantee as an insurance 
arrangement, especially if it were possible for the amount subject 
to the guarantee to exceed the payor’s fee.120 
117 36 T.C.M. 1755. Cf. Johnson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 896 
(1976), aff’d per curiam by a divided court, 574 F. 2d 189 (1978). 
118 I.R.C. § 111. 
119 This is merely an application of the sham transaction doctrine. 
120 Preferring the characterization of the indemnification payment 
as an insurance payment rather than as a reduction of the broker’s 
fee may appear to be inconsistent with the author’s preference for 
the characterization of a seller’s indemnification as a reduction of 
the purchase price rather than as insurance. However, the author 
believes that the different circumstances of those two situations 
warrant different characterizations. 
 In any event, if the broker’s fee is not deductible, it may 
well be treated as part of the purchaser’s cost of the property. If so, 
a characterization of the indemnification payment as a reduction of 
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 If the payment is treated as insurance proceeds, it would 
seem to be a deductible expense of the payor, provided that the 
guarantee met the ordinary and necessary standard of business 
deductions.121 Would it be erroneous to allow the payor a 
deduction and yet have no corresponding income to the taxpayer? 
In the author’s view, that is not an error. An insurance company 
that made a payment on a damage claim can deduct its payment 
even though it is not income to the person who received the 
payment.  
 In conclusion, reimbursements should be excluded from 
income when they are paid for additional taxes that were incurred 
because of the payor’s error regardless of whether the error was 
made in preparing the tax return. If the reimbursement is made 
pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement of a third party, it should be 
excluded from income; but the reimbursement may reduce a 
taxpayer’s costs in acquiring assets or engaging in a transaction. If 
the reimbursement is made pursuant to a tax indemnity agreement 
of a seller, it is a difficult question as to whether it should be taxed 
because of the problems that Professor Zelenak described. In the 
author’s view, unless empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
 
the broker’s fee will reduce the purchaser’s basis, and thus will 
have the same tax effect as would an insurance payment. 
121 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
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problem that Professor Zelenak describes is extensive, the 
indemnification payments should be excluded.  
D. Employee Business Expenses 
Federal income tax deductions can be divided into several 
categories. First, they can be either itemized or nonitemized 
deductions. Nonitemized deductions are deducted from an 
individual taxpayer’s gross income to determine the individual’s 
adjusted gross income. In general, there are no limitations on the 
amount of an individual’s nonitemized dedutions. Most 
nonitemized deductions are those listed in Code section 62(a), but
a few nonitemized deductions are listed instead in other Code 
sections.122 All deductions that are not nonitemized, other than the 
deductions for personal exemptions, are itemized deductions.123 
Itemized deductions can be deducted only if neither the 
taxpayer nor the taxpayer’s spouse elect to use a standard 
deduction.124 In addition, all but three types of itemized deductions 
 
122 For example, Code §§ 71(f)(1)(B) (excess alimony payments), 
164(f) (self-employment taxes) and 165(h)(4)(A) (personal 
casualty losses that do not exceed the taxpayer’s personal casualty 
gains) are nonitemized deductions that are not listed in Code § 
62(a).  
123 I.R.C. § 63(d). 
124 I.R.C. § 63(b), (c)(6)(A). The standard deduction is a specified 
dollar amount allowable to individuals in lieu of their itemized 
deductions. I.R.C. § 63(b), (c), (f). Thus, an individual can either 
take his itemized deductions or a standard deduction, but cannot 
take both. On the other hand, an individual can take all of his 
nonitemized deductions even if he elects to use the standard 
deduction. 
66
are subject to an overall limitation that applies if the individual’s 
adjusted gross income exceeds a specified amount.125 This overall 
limitation is scheduled to be phased out temporarily beginning in 
the year 2006, but it is scheduled to come back in full force in 
2011.126 In addition to the general limitations that apply, certain 
itemized deductions have specific limitations that apply only to 
that deduction.127 
A subcategory of itemized deductions, referred to as 
“miscellaneous itemized deductions,” is subjected to another 
limitation.128 All itemized deductions that are not listed in Code 
section 67(b) are miscellaneous itemized deductions.129 The total 
of an individual’s miscellaneous itemized deductions for a taxable 
year can be deducted only to the extent that the total exceeds 2% of 
the individual’s adjusted gross income for that year.130 This 2% of 
adjusted gross income floor is in addition to all other limitations 
that apply to the deduction. In addition, miscellaneous itemized 
 
125 I.R.C. § 68(a). Initially, the threshold specified amount was 
$100,000, but it is adjusted annually for inflation. I.R.C. § 68(b). 
For the year 2005, the threshold amount is $145,950. Rev. Proc. 
2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970. The three itemized deductions that 
are excluded from this overall limitation are medical expenses, 
investment interest, and certain losses. I.R.C. § 68(c).  
126 I.R.C. § 68(f), (g). Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38.  
127 For example, medical expenses can be deducted only to the 
extent that they exceed a percentage of the individual’s adjusted 
gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a).  
128 I.R.C. § 67(a).  
129 I.R.C. § 67(b).  
130 I.R.C. 67(a).  
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deductions are not deductible at all when the taxpayer is subject to 
the alternative minimum tax.131 If the alternative minimum tax 
system is not amended, it is predicted that by 2010, one-third of the 
total number of taxpayers will be taxed under the alternative 
minimum tax system rather than the “regular” system.132 
Subject to a few exceptions,133 unreimbursed business 
expenses of an employee are itemized deductions.134 Since the 
itemized deduction for employee business expenses is not listed in 
Code section 67(b), it is a miscellaneous itemized deduction. On 
the other hand, to the extent that an employee’s business expense is 
reimbursed by the employer, the deduction for that expense is a 
nonitemized deduction that is not subject to any limitations.135 
Indeed, since the nonitemized deduction for the expense will wash 
 
131 I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).  
132 Gregg A. Esenwein, Congressional Service Report for 
Congress, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals 6 
(January 30, 2003). 
133 Certain expenses connected with an employee’s claim based on 
discrimination are nonitemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(19) [20]. 
Certain business expenses of qualified performing artists, a state 
official, members of reserve components of the armed forces, and 
up to $250 of specified expenses of eligible educators are 
nonitemized deductions, and so are not subject to the limitations 
that apply to itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E). The 
provision for the deduction of a limited amount of educators’ 
expenses is scheduled to expire in 2006.  I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(D) (as 
amended by § 307(a) of the Working Families Relief Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-311, sec. 307(a), § 62, 118 Stat. 1166, 1179). 
Employees can also take a nonitemized deduction for qualified 
moving expenses. I.R.C. § 62(a)(15). 
134 I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), (2). 
135 Id.
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out the inclusion of the reimbursement in the employee’s gross 
income, the Service simplifies the reporting of those items by 
allowing the employee, instead of deducting the expense, simply to 
exclude the reimbursement from income. This alternative of an 
exclusion from income is allowed only if the employee is required 
to account to the employer, and does so.136 
Employee business expenses then are another example of 
nonparallel treatment by the Code. Is there a justification for 
treating employees whose business expenses are reimbursed by 
their employer more favorably than employees who bear the 
expense themselves? The difference can be nothing more than 
formulaic – i.e., in some cases, it merely reflects the manner in 
which the employer and employee have chosen to characterize 
their arrangement.  Take the example of a college professor, X, 
who accepts a teaching visit at another college for an academic 
year, consisting of nine months. X will return to his home school 
when the nine-month period is finished. Since X is away from 
home temporarily, his living expenses at the visiting school, 
including his lodging, will constitute deductible business expenses 
under Code section 162(a)(2). However, only one-half of his 
expenses for meals are deductible.137 In negotiating his salary at 
the visiting school, X requests and receives a larger salary to 
 
136 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(1).  
137 I.R.C. § 274(n). 
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compensate for the extra living expenses he will incur. All of X’s 
salary, including the added amount, is included in X’s gross 
income. While X’s living expenses (including one-half of the cost 
of his meals) are deductible, they are miscellaneous itemized 
deductions; because of the limitations on those deductions, X will 
obtain little or no benefit from them. However, if X does not seek a 
higher salary and, instead, obtains an agreement from the visiting 
school to reimburse X for all or part of his living expenses (or to 
pay some of those expenses directly), all of the reimbursed 
expenses, including 100% of the cost of his meals,138 will be 
nonitemized deductions that are fully deductible. Alternatively, if 
X accounts to the visiting school (his employer) for his reimbursed 
expenses, he can simply exclude the reimbursement from his 
income.139 Whatever may be the proper tax treatment of all 
employee business expenses, there is no justification for having 
dramatic differences in the tax treatment of employees based on 
such a substantively meaningless distinction, especially when the 
result can easily be manipulated by some taxpayers.140 
138 Without the reimbursement, only 50% of the cost of the meals 
would have been deductible as a miscellaneous itemized 
deduction. Id. The 50% limitation would apply to the deduction 
allowable to the school for its reimbursement of the employee’s 
meal; but since the school will be a nonprofit organization, 
deductions are of no consequence to it. 
139 See supra note 136 and the text thereto. 
140 For a numerical example illustrating the large tax difference, 
see Kahn, supra note 3, at 21-25.  
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In a prior article, the author criticized the Code’s 
imposition of restrictions on employee business expenses,141 and 
only a summary of some of that discussion will be repeated in this 
piece. Several commentators, including the author, have 
questioned whether there is a justification for imposing general 
restrictions on itemized deductions.142 Regardless of whether the 
current treatment of itemized and miscellaneous itemized 
deductions is proper, unreimbursed employee expenses should not 
be included in the list of those deductions.  
Let us focus on the justifications offered for the 
miscellaneous itemized deduction provision since that is the 
principal restriction on deductibility and since those also seem to 
be the justifications for any restrictions on itemized deductions.  
Four justifications have been suggested:143 (1) Reducing 
administrative burdens for the Service and the taxpayer for the 
treatment of small amounts that do not warrant that time and 
 
141 See Kahn, supra note 3, at 20-25.  
142 Kahn, supra note 3, at 29-53; Robert J.Peroni, Reform in the 
Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax 
System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (2001). See also Martin J. McMahon, 
Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let 
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 
493 (1993). 
143 The first three of these justifications are suggested in Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1896, at 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987). The fourth is 
suggested by some commentators. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, 
Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys’ 
Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 533 (2000). 
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expense, (2) Some of the included items have elements of personal 
expenditures and would have been incurred even if no business 
purpose had also been present, (3) Taxpayers make errors in 
reporting itemized deductions, and (4) The government needs the 
additional revenue that the imposition of the limitations will bring. 
In a prior article, the author dealt with each of those purported 
justifications and concluded that they do not justify the 
restrictions.144 
As to the first justification of administrative burden, while 
the provision will ease the record-keeping burden of some 
taxpayers, it will do little for prudent taxpayers who will retain 
records of those expenses since they will not know until the end of 
the year whether they will benefit from itemizing their 
deductions.145 While the limitations on employee business 
expenses will ease the Service’s auditing burden by removing 
those items from many taxpayers’ returns, there are offsetting 
auditing burdens created by the provision because some 
individuals will seek classification as independent contractors, 
 
144 Kahn, supra note 3, at 40-53.  
145 See Peroni, supra note 142, at 1418. Contra Deborah H. 
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and 
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 167 n.235 (1989) (“The floor is 
high enough that most taxpayers no longer keep records.”). If 
Professor Schenk is correct, it is likely that some of those 
taxpayers would have been entitled to itemized deductions if they 
had kept records, and a system which discourages record-keeping 
to the detriment of some taxpayers could be viewed as undesirable. 
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rather than as employees, in order to escape the imposition of those 
limitations. The Service will have to determine whether 
independent contractor classification is proper, and may have to 
litigate that issue.146 
The second justification that many miscellaneous itemized 
deductions have substantial personal elements is equally true of 
business expenses of the self-employed and of reimbursed 
employee expenses. One reason for preferring reimbursed 
employee expenses is the assertion that the employer will 
reimburse an employee for any legitimate business expense. But, 
many employers do not reimburse employee expenses because 
they do not wish to undertake the administrative burden of 
maintaining a reimbursement plan; instead those employers pay 
their employees a higher salary and leave the administration of the 
costs to the employees.147 Another contention is that an employer 
will oversee the legitimacy of expenses he reimburses, but that will 
not apply to an employee of a corporation in which the employee 
has a controlling interest (i.e., a closely held corporation).148 
Moreover, many legitimate business expenses of self-employed 
 
146 See Kahn, supra note 3, at 41-43. See also Glen E. Coven, 
Congress as Indian-Giver: “Phasing-Out” Tax Allowances Under 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505, 527
(1987) (“[B]enefits must be offset by the complexity and 
manipulation created by plans to avoid the new floor.”). 
147 See Peroni, supra note 142, at 1422. 
148 McMahon, supra note 142, at 493.  
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individuals also have elements of personal enjoyment that 
accompany them, but those expenses have not been subjected to 
the restrictions applied to employee expenses.  Also, many 
employers reimburse employee’s travel expenses by providing the 
employee with a per diem allowance for which no accounting is 
made to the employer, and yet those employee expenses are 
nonitemized deductions.149 
The third justification that taxpayers make errors in 
reporting deductions is subject to three responses: (1) Errors are 
made in many parts of a tax return, and there is no reason to single 
out employee business expenses as being more prone to error than 
other items; (2) Not everyone makes mistakes, and it is harsh to 
punish the innocent for the errors of others; and (3) Creating a 
floor for the deduction is not an adequate solution since those with 
large amounts of such items that are properly deductible can still 
make an error in taking an unwarranted deduction of a small item.  
The fourth justification of raising revenue can apply to any 
provision that raises tax costs, and revenue can be raised with 
provisions that do not distinguish taxpayers on such a formulaic 
basis. 
In sum, the lack of parallel treatment (and resulting 
violation of horizontal equity) is egregious in this case because the 
 
149 Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1T(e)(1).  
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difference between those who do and do not qualify for a 
deduction can be so nominal as to make the distinction arbitrary 
and opens the way to manipulation. While manipulation is not 
available to all employees, it worsens the case for the restrictive 
treatment of employee expenses that some employees can easily 
avoid those restrictions while others cannot.   
The question is whether the justifications for distinguishing 
unreimbursed employee expenses outweigh the lack of parallel 
treatment. In this case, the goal of parallelism is especially strong 
given the manner in which the limitations can be so easily 
circumvented by an arrangement between an employee and his 
employer.  On the other side, the justifications for different tax 
treatment do not hold up well under scrutiny and can be considered 
weak. On balance, this is a case where parallelism and horizontal 
equity should prevail.150 
E.  Life Insurance Proceeds. 
When an individual dies, no deduction is allowed for the 
loss of that individual’s human capital. Yet, the receipt of the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy typically is excluded from the 
 
150 Another objection to the limitation on employee expense 
deductions is that they do not apply to independent contractors, 
whose business expenses are nonitemized deductions and fully 
deductible. That difference in treatment raises an issue of 
horitzontal equity unless a good reason exists for treating 
independent contractors more favorably. In a prior article, the 
author questioned whether the distinction is warranted. See Kahn, 
supra note 3, at 62-63. 
75
recipient’s income under Code section 101(a)(1). There are several 
exceptions to that exclusion. Interest received on the insurer’s 
retention of the proceeds is taxable when distributed.151 The 
interest element in amounts that are paid to beneficiaries in 
installments is taxable.152 If the insurance contract had been 
transferred for consideration prior to the insured’s death, the 
“transfer for value” rule could cause the recognition of income in 
the amount by which the proceeds exceed the consideration and 
premiums previously paid by the distributee; but there are 
circumstances in which the transfer for value rule does not 
apply.153 
The exclusion of the life insurance proceeds, while denying 
a deduction for the loss of human capital on the death of an 
uninsured individual, contravenes the principle of parallelism.  The 
context of this situation may seem familiar to the reader since the 
circumstance is similar to the issue discussed in Part IV B of this 
article dealing with damages received for a physical injury. 
Especially when the physical injury results in death, the 
circumstances have much in common. In both cases, the payments 
(damage payments or life insurance proceeds) are not necessarily 
 
151 I.R.C. § 101(c).  
152 I.R.C. § 101(d).  
153 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).  For example, the transfer for value rule does 
not apply to transfers made to: a corporation of which the insured 
is a shareholder or officer, a partnership in which the insured is a 
partner, or a partner of the insured. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B). 
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made to the estate of the decedent; they often are payable to 
someone who survived the decedent. But they are both paid to 
replace the human capital that was lost because of the decedent’s 
death.154 
The reasons for not allowing a deduction for the loss of 
unreimbursed human capital that are discussed in Part IV B apply 
equally to the instant situation and will not be repeated here. 
However, the reasons for excluding damages for physical injuries 
do not apply to the same extent to the receipt of life insurance 
proceeds.  
One might contend that the receipt of life insurance 
proceeds is not as easily classified as an involuntary conversion 
since a voluntary decision was made to purchase the insurance 
contract.155 However, the death of the insured that triggered the 
payment of the proceeds usually is involuntary. By analogy, the 
receipt of insurance proceeds for the loss of property incurred from 
 
154 Damages for wrongful death can include payments for more 
than the loss of human capital. For example, in some states, 
damages can be ordered for the pain and suffering that the victim 
incurred. Nevertheless, damages for the loss of human capital will 
be a part of the award. 
155 There are some commentators who argued that because life 
insurance premiums are not deductible, the proceeds should be 
excluded. See SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 9, at 106-07 
(discussing, but not advocating, the argument). However, the 
author believes that the nondeductability of premiums is 
attributable to the consumption element of obtaining the risk 
coverage that insurance provides, and has little, if any, effect on 
the excludability of the proceeds.  
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a casualty or theft is treated as an involuntary conversion. There 
seems no reason to regard the receipt of life insurance proceeds 
differently. The policy of treating involuntary conversions liberally 
should apply to the receipt of life insurance proceeds. That 
consideration alone is not sufficient to justify an exclusion, but it 
lends support to that treatment if other considerations point in the 
same direction. 
The human capital that was lost by the insured’s death is 
not bought and sold in commercial markets.156 The insurance 
proceeds are designed to replace that capital with dollars since 
monetary replacement is all that is available. There is a significant 
non-commercial element to the insurance even though it involves 
dollars. If the government were to tax the proceeds, or so much of 
the proceeds as exceeded the premiums paid, it would be 
preventing the insured from providing adequate substitution to his 
beneficiaries of what they lost when he died. While there is some 
unpleasant aspect to the government’s cashing in on the insured’s 
death to the detriment of his family in many cases, it lacks the 
rapacious appearance that the taxation of damages would 
 
156 Obviously, people do exploit their human capital commercially. 
For example, an employed person receives wages in return for the 
use of his human capital. But, that is a type of leasing arrangement 
as contrasted to a disposition of the capital.   
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engender.157 This consideration has less force here then when 
applied to the receipt of damages for physical injuries.  
The case for excluding life insurance proceeds on 
principled grounds is not as strong as it is in the case of physical 
injury damages. It seems likely that the proceeds are excluded to 
encourage the purchase of life insurance on the ground that having 
families protected from destitution (or protecting families from 
having to liquidate family-owned businesses) because of the loss 
of an income producer is socially desirable, and so life insurance 
should be encouraged by the tax law to implement that policy. In 
addition, if the insurance proceeds were taxed, an insured 
individual would need to purchase a much higher amount of 
insurance to cover his needs. While Congress may wish to 
encourage the purchase of life insurance coverage, it has no reason 
to wish to increase the cost of that coverage.  
The adoption of that policy of encouraging the acquisition 
of life insurance is buttressed by the considerations noted above, 
acknowledging that some are weaker here than in the case of 
physical damages. However persuasive one does or does not find 
that justification, it has no application to the question of allowing a 
deduction for the death of an uninsured person. The lack of 
 
157 The lack of concern for this appearance is reflected in the 
application of an estate tax on the death of an individual, but that 
tax applies only to wealthy individuals.  
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parallelism appears justified if one accepts the apparent rationale 
for excluding the life insurance proceeds, but is not justified if one 
concludes that the grounds for excluding the proceeds are 
inadequate. In the latter case, it is not a question of applying 
parallelism, but merely that there are not strong enough grounds 
for providing an exclusion. 
F.  Meals and Lodging 
Meals and lodging that are furnished to an employee, his 
spouse and dependents, on the employer’s business premises for 
the convenience of the employer, are excluded from the 
employee’s income by Code section 119(a) if certain conditions 
are satisfied.158 The “business premises” requirement has been 
expanded to a small extent by the judicial and administrative 
construction of that term, but the expansion is very narrow and 
limited.159 Also, in certain circumstances, an employer’s furnishing 
of meals to employees can be excluded as a de minimis fringe 
 
158 In the case of lodging, there is an additional requirement that 
the employee have been required by his employer to accept the 
lodging as a condition of his employment. For a discussion of the 
application of this exclusion, see KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 
164-68. 
159 “Business premises” must be either premises “where the 
employee performs a significant portion of his duties or…where 
the employer conducts a significant portion of his business. 
Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609, 615 (1973) Acq. See 
KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 165-66 for a discussion of when 
the lodging can be physically separated from the employer’s 
regular place of business because business is also conducted at the 
lodging.  
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benefit under Code section 132(e)(2). Yet, if not provided by the 
employer or incurred in connection with business moving or 
entertainment or travel away from home, the employee’s cost of 
such meals and lodging is not deductible.160 The question is 
whether that nonparallel treatment is justified.  
It is easy to understand why an individual’s cost of meals 
and lodging for himself and his immediate family generally are not 
deductible because they constitute personal consumption. The 
Code expressly provides, subject to specific exceptions, “no 
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family 
expenses.”161 Even if that provision were omitted from the Code, 
such expenses would not be deductible because they would not fit 
within any Code provision granting a deduction. The denial of a 
deduction for such expenses comports with a fundamental 
principle of taxation that no deduction is allowable for personal 
consumption. 
While the reasons for excluding from an employee’s 
income the meals and lodging provided by the employer for the 
employer’s convenience are not set forth in any authoritative 
statement, the likely purposes of the exclusion are reasonably 
discernable. The exclusion initially was established by two 
 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5). 
161 I.R.C. § 262(a).  
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administrative rulings in 1919.162 One of those rulings exempted 
from gross income the value of meals and lodging furnished to a 
seaman while aboard ship. As to the exclusion of the lodging, it is 
easy to see why the government agreed to exclude it from income. 
A seaman has to live somewhere when he is not at sea, and often 
that meant that the cost of lodging at sea duplicated an expense that 
the seaman also incurred to maintain a home on land. The 
duplicated or added expense of a berth at sea was attributable to 
the requirements of the seaman’s work. In the case of many 
seamen, the employer’s provision of lodging did not add to the 
seaman’s wealth since it did not relieve him of the expense of 
maintaining a home. Moreover, the berth provided by the employer 
typically would be spartan; and since comparable quarters were not 
sold on the market, it would be difficult to value.163 
The circumstance in which the lodging exclusion was 
applied to a seaman is one in which an expense paid by the 
employee for that lodging would be deductible today. If the 
seaman had to pay for his lodging, the expense would qualify 
today under Code section 162(a)(2) as a deductible business travel 
expense away from home. But, even in that case, the exclusion is a 
 
162 O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919); O.D. 11, 1 C.B. 66 (1919). 
163 Another early illustration of the rule was its application to the 
Army’s provision of lodging quarters (or the commuted value of 
the lodging) to officers. Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cls. 552 
(1925). 
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nonparallel provision because the seaman’s deduction would be an 
employee business expense and so would be subject to the severe 
limitations imposed on miscellaneous itemized deductions.164 
Moreover, unlike the case of the seaman, many of the 
circumstances to which the exclusion has been applied are ones in 
which no deduction would have been allowable to the employee if 
he had borne the cost of the meals and lodging. 
Even from the time of its initiation in 1919, the exclusion 
was not limited to circumstances where the lodging constituted a 
double expense.  In the other 1919 ruling,165 cash paid to an 
employee of the American Red Cross for maintenance expenses 
was held to be excluded from income to the extent that the 
employee’s actual maintenance expenses did not exceed the 
amount he received. However, cash payments of that nature would 
not qualify for Code section 119 today and would be included in 
the employee’s income.166 There is still no requirement of a double 
 
164 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. In a prior article, 
the author concluded that the limitations on the deduction of 
employee business expenses are unwarranted. Kahn, supra note 3. 
If the seaman were required by the employer to pay a specified 
amount for his lodging then the proper treatment is to reduce the 
seaman’s salary by the amount he is required to pay back to the 
employer and to treat the seaman as having been furnished the 
lodging. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b), and infra note 182.    
165 OD. 11, supra note 162. 
166 See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). While it is 
clear that Congress intended to tax cash receipts for meals and 
lodging, that distinction has been criticized as irrational. See 
Adrian A. Kragen and Klonda Speer, IRC Section 119: Is 
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expense in current law, and so one has to search elsewhere for a 
rationale for the exclusion.  
As to the seaman’s meals that his employer provided, there 
was no double expense, and so once again we see that the double 
expense justification does not explain the adoption of what 
constitutes a much broader rule. We must look further for an 
explanation.  
One year after the promulgation of the two 1919 rulings, 
Treasury amended its regulations to provide that meals and lodging 
furnished to an employee for the convenience of the employer is 
excluded from income.167 From that time on, the exclusion was 
established, but it underwent many alterations over the years.168 
On account of the confusion as to the application of the exclusion 
and of Congressional dissatisfaction with the restrictive 
construction that the government adopted, Congress enacted Code 
section 119 as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.169 
Unfortunately, the statutory codification of the exclusion did not 
 
Convenience of the Employer A Valid Concept?, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 
921 (1978). 
167 Amendment to Article 33 of Regulation 45, Treas. Reg. 45, 
art.33 (1920 ed.), T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920). 
168 For a history of the tax law’s treatment of the exclusion, see 
Kragen and Speer, supra note 148, at 922-927. 
169 H.Rept. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 21d Sess., at A38-A39 (1954); 
Kragen and Speer, supra note 166. 
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dispel all of the confusion over its application, and questions 
continued to be litigated and alterations made.170 
What then is the rationale for the exclusion?  Professor 
Kragen and Ms. Speer stated: 
The premise underlying exclusion in section 119 is 
that the greater the employer’s control of the 
employee’s enjoyment of the meals or lodging, the 
less likely they will be considered as compensation 
and the less directly will the employee be held to 
have benefitted. If the employee is benefitted only 
indirectly, the value of the accommodations 
provided will be excluded from income, even 
though some compensation factor is present.171 
While there is no authoritative support for the proposition, 
there is reason to believe that the tax law generally will not tax 
benefits received by someone who obtains those benefits by being 
the incidental beneficiary of actions taken by another for the 
other’s own purposes other than a compensatory purpose. For 
example, if an applicant for employment is invited by a 
prospective employer to travel to the employer’s location for an 
interview, and if the prospective employer reimburses the applicant 
for his travel expenses, the reimbursement will be excluded from 
the applicant’s income.172 It is in the prospective employer’s 
economic interest to have the applicant come to it rather than to 
 
170 Id. See also the student note, J.Patrick McDavitt, Dissection of 
A Malignancy: The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine,” 44
NOTRE DAME L.R. 1104 (1969). 
171 See Kragen and Speer, supra note 166. 
172 Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177. See infra Part IV G of the 
article. 
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send its agents to the applicant. The applicant benefits from being 
provided travel to the interview, but the prospective employer did 
not provide that travel in order to compensate the applicant. The 
applicant can be viewed as an incidental beneficiary of a business 
act of the prospective employer.173 
When meals and lodging are provided by an employer for 
its own business purposes, an employee’s benefit can be seen as 
noncompensatory and incidental to the employer’s action. While, 
in many cases, the parties are aware that the employee does benefit 
financially from the arrangement, and so it can affect the 
compensation paid to the employee and thereby has a 
compensatory element, compensation for services is not the 
primary motivating force.174 
Another reason for the exclusion is the administrative 
difficulty of arriving at a fair valuation of the benefits the 
employee received. When property is received or given in kind, the 
income tax law typically values it at the price that would be paid 
by a willing buyer from a willing seller where both parties have 
full knowledge of relevant information and neither is under a 
 
173 The treatment of the reimbursement of an applicant’s expense is 
discussed in Part IV G of this article. 
174 See Treas. Reg. 1.119-1(a)(2) (“[I]f the employer furnishes 
meals to his employee for a substantial noncompensatory business 
reason, the meals so furnished will be regarded as furnished for the 
convenience of the employer, even though such meals are also 
furnished for a compensatory reason.”)  
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compulsion to buy or sell.175 Of course, property is bought and 
sold in different markets (e.g., retail, wholesale, private sale), and 
the geographic location of the market can alter the price. But, that 
factor has not proved to cause difficulty in the tax law’s 
determination of value. In some cases, the benefits received by the 
employee are not ones that are sold on the market, and so valuation 
becomes more speculative in that case. But, that is not always true, 
and sometimes (for example, in the case of meals for restaurant 
employees) the same items are sold to the public.176 
But, the problem of determining the value of the 
employee’s benefits is more difficult than merely determining the 
market value of the items. One aspect of meals and lodging that 
qualify for the exclusion is that the employee has little or no choice 
as to whether to accept them. In the case of lodging, acceptance 
must be a condition of the employee’s employment.177 So, while 
the market puts one value on the benefit received, it may have a 
much lower subjective value to the employee. While the tax law 
does not ordinarily accommodate subjective differences,178 it 
seems unrealistic to ignore them in this situation. Consider the 
 
175 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2).  
176 See Kragen and Speer, supra note 166, at 949. 
177 I.R.C. § 119(a)(2). While Code § 119 does not require that the 
employee accept provided meals, practical considerations often 
will mean that he has no realistic opportunity to eat elsewhere. 
Time constraints often make the proffered meal the only one that is 
feasible.  
178 Cf. Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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plight of a janitor who is employed by a luxury hotel in an isolated 
area and is provided a room in the basement of the hotel for his 
living quarters, a room that would not otherwise be rented to 
clients of the hotel. If the location and elegance of the hotel is 
taken into account, the room will have a much greater value than 
the janitor could afford or would ever pay. But the room likely 
does have a subjective value to the janitor that is significantly less 
than its market value. The difficulty of establishing that subjective 
value is a factor in allowing the exclusion and thereby avoiding 
that problem.   
Are those reasons adequate to justify the exclusion? In the 
case of a double expenditure for lodging, it would seem so; but that 
is not the typical application of the rule. The rule of exclusion 
provides a great advantage to taxpayers who are employed in jobs 
that require them to live on the business premises, and that 
difference in treatment of employees violates the principle of 
horizontal equity.179 Of course, the same can be said of all fringe 
benefits that are excluded from income. But the value of meals and 
lodging can be quite substantial, and so considerations of equity 
take on greater weight. Professor Kragen and Ms. Speer concluded 
that the exclusion is not justified and should be repealed; although 
 
179 The employee’s advantage is mitigated to the extent that the 
benefit he receives is reflected in a reduction of the employee’s 
salary. 
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they did not believe that there is political support for repeal.180 In 
the author’s view, the exclusion should be retained for the reasons 
stated above, but should be modified to be more restricted in some 
areas and more expansive in others.181 
In any event, if the reasons for having the exclusion, 
perhaps with modifications, are deemed adequate, as the author 
believes them to be, there should be no concern that a deduction is 
not allowed for the cost of such items when they are not provided 
by the employer. There are good reasons not to allow a deduction, 
and the valuation and incidental benefit rationales for the exclusion 
do not apply to the situation where the employee pays for his 
lodging and meals.182 While the exclusion does violate horizontal 
equity by discriminating against employees whose jobs do not 
require them to live on the business premises, those persons have a 
greater choice as to where to live or eat, and so they are not in the 
 
180 Kragen and Speer, supra note 166, at 949. 
181 Professors Kragen and Speer recommended modification 
because they did not believe that repeal was feasible politically. Id.
While the scope of the exclusion should be narrowed in some 
respects, it should be broadened in others. For example, the denial 
of an exclusion for cash reimbursements is not warranted. Id.
182 There is an exception, and properly so, if the employee is 
charged a fixed amount for the meals and lodging, and is required 
to pay it regardless of whether he accepts the benefit. Treas. Reg. § 
1.119-1(a)(3), (b). In that case, the situation is substantively 
identical to the situation where the employee is provided the meals 
or lodging and is paid a lower salary. The additional salary which 
must be returned to the employer is merely a bookkeeping item 
and should be disregarded since it does not alter the substance of 
the arrangement. See supra note 164. 
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identical position of the tax-favored employee. Moreover, some of 
an employee’s advantage from the exclusion will be lost to the 
extent it causes a reduction of the employee’s salary; but that 
reduction of the employee’s benefit may be offset by the benefit 
the employer enjoys from paying lower wages, which violates the 
horizontal equity principle as to the employers. It is a value 
judgment as to whether the disparate treatment is so offensive as to 
warrant repealing the exclusion, but the author does not deem it to 
be so.183 
G. Job Interview Expenses. 
 Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(f) states that 
“expenses such as those paid or incurred in seeking employment or 
in placing oneself in a position to begin rendering personal services 
for compensation” are not deductible under Code section 212. The 
construction of that provision has had a checkered history,184 but it 
finally has been construed to mean that expenses of seeking 
employment in a trade or business in which the taxpayer is not 
already actively engaged are not deductible; but expenses of 
 
183 Food and lodging are only one example of nonparallel treatment 
provided by the Code in the employee benefit area. The two 
largest, in terms of dollar amounts, examples are employer 
provided health insurance and retirement benefits. In order to 
determine whether such nonparallel treatment is justified, each 
item must be examined separately to see if there are countervailing 
considerations which outweigh the goal of parallelism.  
184 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 35, at 446-48, and the 
discussion in Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55. 
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seeking employment in the same trade or business in which the 
taxpayer is already engaged (or was previously engaged if the 
unemployment gap is not too great) is deductible as a business 
expense under Code section 162.185 However, even when 
deductible, since it will be an employee business expense, it will 
be a miscellaneous itemized deduction that is subject to severe 
limitations on the amount that can be deducted.186 
The reason for denying a deduction for expenses of seeking 
employment in a new trade or business is that the taxpayer is not 
yet engaged in that trade, and so the expenditures cannot qualify as 
business expenses. As to whether they could be treated as incurred 
“for the production of income” within the meaning of Code section 
212(1), they will not qualify for deduction under that provision 
because they are capital expenditures (i.e., expenditures incurred in 
an attempt to create a relationship that will produce future income). 
Capital expenditures are not currently deductible.187 Even if such 
expenses were held to be deductible, and they have not been, the 
deduction would be a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which is 
subject to severe limitations as to the amount that can be 
deducted.188 
185 Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55. 
186 Those limitations are discussed in Part IV D of the article. 
187 I.R.C. § 263. 
188 Those limitations are discussed in Part IV D of the article. 
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 In contrast to the treatment of unreimbursed expenses 
incurred in seeking employment, consider the tax treatment of a 
taxpayer who is reimbursed by a prospective employer for the cost 
of traveling to the employer’s location, including living costs 
incurred while at the location. In Revenue Ruling 63-77,189 the 
Service held that the taxpayer can exclude such reimbursements 
from his income. This exclusion is not parallel to the treatment of 
unreimbursed expenses since the latter are either not deductible at 
all or are deductible as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject 
to severe limitations. 
 The justification for excluding the reimbursements was 
briefly noted above in connection with the tax treatment of an 
employer’s provision of meals and lodging to an employee.190 It is 
in the business interests of the prospective employer to have the 
employee travel to the prospective employer’s location so that the 
employer can interview him. The applicant is performing an act for 
the benefit of the prospective employer, and so the costs incurred 
in that act should be borne by the prospective employer on whose 
behalf they are incurred. In this light, note that the Service has 
ruled that “[i]t is ... a well established position of the Internal 
Revenue Service that reimbursements for expenses on behalf of 
another in a nonemployment context are not includible in the 
 
189 1963-1 C.B. 177. 
190 See supra Part IV F of the article. 
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taxpayer’s income.”191 Of course, the applicant also benefits from 
making the trip to the employer’s location in that he obtains an 
opportunity to receive a job offer, and he may enjoy the trip, 
especially if the prospective employer is located in an interesting 
or attractive city. But, the purpose of the prospective employer in 
making the reimbursement is not to compensate the applicant; it is 
made to pay the costs of actions for the prospective employer’s 
benefit. The applicant can be seen as an incidental beneficiary of 
the prospective employer’s expenditures, and should not be taxed 
for the benefits he enjoyed as an incidental consequence of the 
prospective employer’s business activity.  
 Another element of job interviewing expenses should be 
noted. One problem with allowing full deductions for job 
interviewing expenditures is the difficulty in determining whether 
the applicant’s interest in the job is bona fide. If a full deduction 
were allowed, a taxpayer might arrange an interview with a firm in 
a resort town in order to qualify his travel for a deduction. While 
that may also occur when the prospective employer reimburses the 
applicant for his expenses, the difference in that latter case is that 
an independent party made a judgment that the applicant has a 
serious interest in the job; and the strength of that judgment is 
evidenced by the fact that the prospective employer expended its 
 
191 Rev. Rul. 80-99, 1980-1 C.B. 10.  
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own funds to bring the applicant to the interview. There is merit to 
the government’s accepting the bona fides of a taxpayer’s action 
where a third party has demonstrated its belief that the action is 
business related.192 
The lack of parallel treatment here is not sufficient to 
warrant making any changes. There are good reasons not to allow a 
deduction for unreimbursed expenses incurred in seeking a job in a 
new trade or business. The question of whether deductible 
expenses in interviewing for a job in the same trade or business 
should be subjected to severe restrictions raises issues as to 
whether those limitations are defensible at all, and, if so, whether 
they are defensible in the context of employee business expenses. 
The resolution of those issues is broader than the question of 
parallelism and has little to do with the subject of this article.193 
There are good reasons for excluding reimbursements from income 
that have no application to unreimbursed expenses. Parallelism is 
not a meaningful issue in this context.  
V. Conclusion 
 A proposal for the repeal or alteration of a specific tax 
provision often will utilize the principle of parallelism or 
horizontal equity to support that proposal. While those two 
 
192 The same substantiation argument could apply in other 
situations where an exclusion is allowed.  
193 For a discussion of those issues, see Kahn, supra note 3. 
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principles are not irrelevant, they should have little weight and 
often are utilized inappropriately. The application of those 
principles rests initially on a determination that persons who are 
given different tax treatments occupy essentially the same income 
positions. The identification of the points of contact between two 
taxpayers that are sufficient to make their income positions equal 
invokes value judgments over which reasonable people can, and 
often do, disagree. But, the source of the frailty of the utility of 
those two principles lies deeper than the mere difficulty of 
identifying those items that constitute their relevant points of 
comparison. 
 Horizontal equity applies to two persons who are in very 
similar income positions. Nonparallelism refers to providing 
different tax treatment to circumstances that are essentially the 
same. Two persons are rarely in identical circumstances, and two 
circumstances that appear to be the same can have significant 
differences. To resolve whether two persons or circumstances are 
to be treated the same by the tax law, it is necessary to determine 
whether the differences that exist are relevant for that purpose.  
The problem is that even factual circumstances that are similar can 
raise quite different tax policy considerations that lead to treating 
them differently for tax purposes.  
95
 For example, in the case of two persons who incurred a 
similar loss for which one was reimbursed and one was not, an 
obvious difference between them is that one was reimbursed. If the 
tax excludes the reimbursement from income but denies a 
deduction for the loss, does that violate horizontal equity?  Given 
that the exclusion of the reimbursement from income has the 
identical tax consequence to allowing a deduction for the loss, it is 
easy to leap to the conclusion that the tax treatment is equivalent to 
allowing a deduction for reimbursed taxpayers while denying one 
to unreimbursed taxpayers.   
 However, as shown in the text, the apparent equivalence of 
an exclusion to a deduction is an illusion. The tax policy 
considerations that arise in connection with the tax treatment of a 
reimbursement can be quite different from the policies that arise 
from the tax treatment of an unreimbursed loss. Those differences 
in tax policy considerations turn the apparent identity of the two 
situations into a mirage that vanishes under inspection. Even if the 
similarity of the circumstances of the two taxpayers is deemed 
sufficient to invoke the principle of horizontal equity, that principle 
may be outweighed by other considerations that point in the 
opposite direction. Putting it differently, horizontal equity is 
merely one consideration or goal to be weighed together with other 
relevant considerations.   
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 Each instance of different tax treatments must be examined 
separately to determine whether the difference is warranted. As to 
the tax provisions discussed in this article, the reader can see that 
different tax treatment is warranted for most of those provisions, 
but is not proper for some.194 
Although the principles of parallelism and horizontal equity 
often are proffered as justifications for a proposed change in the 
tax law, the proponents typically attribute far more weight to those 
principles then they deserve. Moreover, in the case of some 
provisions, the principles are inapplicable because the apparent 
equivalence of circumstances proves to be an illusion. It is for this 
reason that the author’s title to this article refers to the “mirage of 
equivalence.” 
 
194 This article has covered only a few instances of nonparallel 
treatment in the Code, but there are many others (especially in the 
employee fringe benefit area).  
